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SINCE AQUINO: THE PHILIPPINE TANGLE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
Justus M van der Kroef 
"We can't get to where we want to until we spell out where we 
want to go-and the Cory regime hasn't furnished any of us with a 
road map," one leading Manila newspaper columnist complained in 
his assessment of Philippine President Corazon ("Cory") Aquino's 
first three months in office. 1 The criticism is not altogether fair. Since 
her sudden accession on February 25, 1986, as her nation's ninth Pres-
ident, Mrs. Aquino, a novice in the rough and tumble of Philippine 
politics, has shown surprising adroitness, moderation and courage in 
facing a host of daunting national problems, not least among them 
sharp public division and uncertainty over her country's future rela-
tionship with its erstwhile colonial mentor and oldest ally, the United 
States. By early 1987 her political survival seemed even more 
remarkable. 
For Washington, the Philippines' course under Aquino and be-
yond hardly can be a matter of minor importance. Already in early 
March, 1986 a U.S. Defense Department study, details of which re-
main classified, estimated that (if it came to that) relocation of such 
U.S. military facilities in Luzon as the Clark Air Base and the Subic 
Bay Naval Station, to such nearby locations as Tinian or Guam, 
would cost at least $8 billion.2 As is known, the Clark and Subic 
leases expire in 1991, and while Mrs. Aquino has vowed that she will 
not disturb the lease arrangement until then, there is sharp contro-
versy in her government and in Philippine society generally over any 
lease renewal, for reasons to be discussed below. Mqreover, not just 
Subic and Clark are likely to be involved. There are 11 other military 
installations in the country-Cubi Point in La Union province, the 
Mactan Air Base in Cebu City and the U.S. Navy relay point in San 
Miguel, Tarlac province are a few-where the United States maintains 
sophisticated communications facilities. 3 
Important U.S. security and economic interests need to be re-
1. Maximo V. Soliven in Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 7, 1986, p. 5. 
2. The Straits Times (Singapore), March 5, 1986, p. 6. See also William H. Sullivan, 
"Relocating Bases in the Philippines," Washington Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1984), 
pp. 114-119. 
3. Midday (Manila), June 6, 1986, p. 6. 
(2) 
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solved in the Philippines' faction-ridden, Communist-endangered and 
poverty-stricken society. For Mrs. Aquino and/or her immediate suc-
cessors, Philippine national problems fall into four major categories: 
(1) constitutional legitimacy; (2) the achievement of some stability 
with various contending power structures, among them political fac-
tions, the Catholic Church, the Army, the Communists and other 
armed dissidents and "private armies;" (3) a basis for long-term eco-
nomic growth amidst an exploding population; and, (4) the nation's 
strategic and foreign policy priorities. 
I. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT 
As for constitutional legitimacy, the political fait accompli of the 
February 1986 change of power tended to be confused with the rule of 
law. To be sure, there was from the start little question of Mrs. Ac-
, quina's considerable personal popularity, particularly among many of 
Metropolitan Manila's 7 million inhabitants. But the degree of that 
popularity in practical political terms, before as well as after the Feb-
ruary 2, 1987 plebiscite on the new Aquino-initiated Philippine consti-
tution, always has been more difficult to gauge. By the end of 1986, 
leading U.S. news media had hailed Mrs. Aquino's rise to power as a 
major event of that year. But to many Filipinos, her government thus 
far not only had brought little real change in living conditions and 
employment opportunities, but also had shown on occasion dangerous 
political weaknesses that were perceived-however unfairly-as com-
paring unfavorably with the regime of her predecessor.4 
To the residue of Marcos loyalists and others, Mrs. Aquino's pou-
larity, not to speak of the legitimacy of her Presidential position, are 
seriously undercut by three factors: (a) the questionable circum-
stances surrounding her "revolutionary" accession to power; (b) her 
attempt to revamp the local government structure by postponing 
scheduled local elections and by the summary dismissal of duly elected 
and/or appointed officials and their replacement by pro-Aquino "of-
ficers in charge;" and, (c) Mrs. Aquino's position under the new Con-
stitution ultimately accepted by the country. 
It is difficult to shake the impression that the initial acceptance of 
Mrs. Aquino and her regime was prompted at least to some degree by 
the growing aversion at home and abroad to the malversations of her 
predecessor. Widespread fraud and voter intimidation attended the 
"snap" Presidential election of February 7, 1986, called by then Presi-
4. Report from Manila by Lewis M. Simons, Knight-News-Tribuen news service, De-
cember 26, 1986. 
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dent Ferdinand Marcos almost as an act of bravura during an inter-
view on the "This Week with David Brinkley" U.S. television news 
program on November 3, 1985. However, for several years prior to 
that election, Marcos had been subjected to a campaign of relentless 
criticism, particularly in the U.S. media. The criticism centered on 
serious allegations of human rights abuses by his regime, incompe-
tence in meeting a growing Communist insurgency and economic 
mismanagement. Following the assassination of Philippine opposition 
leader Benigno Aquino on the tarmac of Manila International Airport 
on August 21, 1983-an assassination the responsibility for which 
reached to Marcos' closest advisers-the criticism sharply 
accelerated. 5 
Already in November 1984, a confidential U.S. National Security 
Council analysis had discussed the need for a "well orchestrated policy 
of incentives and disincentives" designed to bring about a "peaceful 
and eventual transition to a successor government" to that of Marcos. 6 
In April 1985, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger expressed 
increasing concern about the deteriorating economic and security situ-
ation in the Philippines. By early October 1985, according to Repre-
sentative Don McCurdy (D-Okla.), a member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives' Intelligence Committee, both the CIA and the De-
fense Intelligence Agency predicted a "catastrophe" for the Philip-
pines to the House Intelligence and the House Armed Services 
Committees if Marcos remained in office and reforms were not carried 
out. 7 Later that same month, after a visit to Marcos by Senator Paul 
Laxalt (R-Nev.) to indicate president Ronald Reagan's concern, offi-
cials from the U.S. State and Defense Departments testified before the 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Marcos' unwillingness 
to "clean up" his political system, improve the military's efficiency and 
break up his crony-ridden business monopolies could lead to a collapse 
in the Philippines. The same sources warned that current trends, in-
cluding allegedly mounting anti-Marcos sentiment and public disaffec-
tion with existing political processes, could lead to a military stalemate 
5. For some of these criticisms see, e.g., David Rosenberg, ed., Marcos and Martial 
Law in the Philippines, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979; Walden Bello, eta/., Devel-
opment Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines, San Francisco: Institute for Food and 
Development Policy, 1982; and Belinda A. Aquino, "The Human Rights Situation in the 
Philippines," Journal of Asian-Pacific and World Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 2 (Winter 1982-
83), pp. 23-30. 
6. Don Oberdorfer reported this in The Washington Post, February 24, 1986, p. 1, col. 
4. 
7. The Straits Times, April 6, 1985, p. 34 and October 10, 1985, p. 8. 
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with the Communist insurgents in as few as three years. 8 
Whether Philippine conditions were indeed as serious as these 
U.S. government representations made them out to be is arguable. 
Moreover, if these conditions were accurately portrayed, whether 
there was a clear official understanding of a realistic feasibility of dem-
ocratic alternatives--certainly of a relatively enduring nature-to the 
Marcos regime seems equally open to debate. In any case, to some the 
Philippine doomsday scenario seemed premature. For example, a 
Communist call to boycott the May 1984 elections for the Batasang 
Pambansa (National Assembly) "failed miserably as throngs of Filipi-
nos voted in a resounding endorsement of the electoral process," and 
by the close of 1985, the Marcos Government appeared to be showing 
sufficient political will to deal with its economic problems so that, ac-
cording to one authoritative survey, "the country's economy may be 
on the road to recovery by 1986."9 Even a senior U.S. Senate Depart-
ment official, after ticking off the Philippines' political and economic 
problems in early December 1985, conceded that "much of the report-
ing" about the country tended to be "apocalyptic."10 
Still, the avalanche of criticism undoubtedly helped to persuade 
Marcos on November 3, 1985 to call his "snap" Presidential poll (hav-
ing been reelected for a six-year term in 1981 Marcos need not have 
run again until 1987). According to Laxalt, the idea of calling such an 
early election had been suggested to Marcos by CIA Director William 
Casey, but there has been no confirmation of this. 11 In any event, 
Marcos appeared confident, probably in view of the fact that past elec-
tions and constitutional plebescites during his tenure had demon-
strated to him that he retained control over key local officials and over 
the electoral process generally. However, precisely because this con-
trol was well understood by his opponents and their foreign support-
ers, the February 7, 1986, Presidential election was subjected to an 
unprecedented degree of foreign and domestic press coverage, and to 
8. The New York Times, October 31, 1985, p. I, col. 3. 
9. Asia 1985 Yearbook (Hongkong, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1985), p. 228, and 
Asia 1986 Yearbook (Hongkong, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1985), p. 225. For a view 
more sympathetic to Marcos, see also A. James Gregor, Crisis in the Philippines: A Threat 
to U.S. Interests (Washington Ethics and Public Policy Center: Georgetown University, 
1984). 
10. U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Michael H. Armacost, "The U.S. and 
the Philippines: Dangers and Opportunities," Current Policy (Washington: U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Bureau of Public Affairs), no. 774, (December 5, 1985), p. 3. 
II. Paul Laxalt, "My Conversations With Ferdinand Marcos," Policy Review, (Sum-
mer !986), pp. 2-5. 
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the scrutiny of a visiting team of official U.S. election observers headed 
by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). 
Then, too, Marcos' opponents, though some were at least in the-
ory outside the formal Philippine political process, mounted a major 
effort to bring him down. For example, it had been difficult for the 
various, splintered, anti-Marcos political forces even to agree on a sin-
gle opposition slate. The leading United Nationalist Democratic Or-
ganization (UNIDO) and its president, Salvador Laurel, at first 
proved unwilling to take second place, on a common opposition ticket, 
to Mrs. Corazon Aquino. Mrs. Aquino had emerged as the Presiden-
tial candidate of the much smaller Lakas ng Bayan (Laban for short) 
or "People's Power Movement." Only the direct intervention of Jaime 
Cardinal Sin, Primate of the Philippine Roman Catholic Church, to 
which some 85 percent of all Filipinos belong, had managed to bring 
about a unified opposition ticket, in which Mrs. Aquino ran for the 
Presidential slot under the Unido banner. Salvador Laurel was named 
as her Vice Presidential running mate. 
Moreover, just as Marcos had his lobbyists in the United States, 
so in the weeks before the election Mrs. Aquino acquired influential 
U.S. Congressional support, as well as the services of U.S. legal and 
consulting firms. As one Aquino lobbyist in Washington put it, it was 
well understood in his camp that the "court of world opinion" would 
be decisive in determining the election outcome. 12 It was in that 
"court of world opinion" that Marcos ultimately lost the gamble of his 
"snap" Presidential election. There is no doubt that, according to 
then prevailing Philippine Constitutional processes, he had won the 
election. On February 15, 1986, the 200-member Batasang Pambansa, 
over the vain protests of anti-Marcos members, officially tabulated the 
election returns and certified Marcos as the winner by some 1.5 mil-
lion votes. 13 But internationally reported and persuasive evidence of 
widespread fraud and voter intimidation almost at once robbed 
Marcos of his claim to victory and constitutional legitimacy. 
Though legal machinery for an investigation of such election ir-
regularities existed, Mrs. Aquino, probably doubting the fairness of 
her chances in such a process, chose not to use the verification process. 
Meanwhile, international media focused their attention on the fraudu-
lent vote count of the Marcos government's Comelec (Commission on 
Elections), and on vote buying, ballot box stuffing and voter intimida-
12. The New York Times, March 13, 1986, p. AS, col. I. 
13. Maharlika Broadcasting System news report, Quezon City, February 15, 1986, in 
Foreign Broadcasting Information Service Reports (hereafter FBIS), February 18, 1986, p. 
P2. 
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tion by pro-Marcos "goon" squads. Later the foreign press was to 
congratulate itself for having "helped to dump a despot" by exposing 
these election malversations. 14 In contrast, the supposedly "honest 
mistakes" in the vote count admitted by the pro-Aquino Namfrel (Na-
tional Movement for Free Elections), and the charges by Philippine 
officials that there were serious elections violations by Namfrel repre-
sentatives and "gun-toting Namfrel men" harassing voters, went virtu-
ally unreported in the U.S. and foreign press. 15 
There were other anomalies. The final Namfrel vote count, is-
sued on February 25, 1986, in which Aquino was declared the winner 
by more than 782,000 votes, widely was regarded abroad as authorita-
tive. This occurred even though Namfrel itself admitted in its final 
report that its data had come from only 70 percent of the country's 
voter turnout and that it could not vouch for the remaining 30 
percentfl 6 
The curiously one-sided media coverage and the failure to investi-
gate charges of vote fraud by partisans of both camps in the election 
did much to tarnish Marcos' image further in the United States. It 
also emboldened the opposition against Marcos even after the 
Batasang Pambansa on February 15, 1986 formally certified him as 
the election winner. On June 11, 1986, the U.S. team headed by Sena-
tor Richard Lugar that had observed the election reported that Mrs. 
Aquino had won a majority of the votes. Lugar also said that the 
Namfrel count "stands as the only reliable indicator" of the Philippine 
voter preference. 17 While Lugar's statement may well be true, absent 
a thorough and impartial investigation into the allegations of fraud on 
both sides, it is difficult to see the basis of the observer team's 
conclusion. 
The issue is not academic. It was not the "fairness" of the Nam-
frel count, nor a widespread perception (whether justified or not) of 
the inherent legitimacy of the election victory that on February 25 
14. David H. Bain, "Letter from Manila-How the Press Helped to Dump a Despot," 
Columbia Journalism Review, (May-June 1986), pp. 27-36. 
15. For details and sources see Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Philippines of Aquino: 
the Long Morning After," World Affairs (Washington), vol. 148, no. 3, (Winter 1985-86), 
pp. 139-150. 
16. Business Day (Manila), February 25, 1968, p. 18. See also FBIS, February 27, 
1986, p. P14. 
17. Philippines Daily Express (Manila), June 12, 1986, p. 2. See also Report to the Presi-
dent of the United States of America on the February 7, 1986 Presidential Election in the 
Philippines Submitted by the United States Observer Delegation. Prepared by the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate and The Center for Democracy, Boston University: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1986. 
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catapulted Mrs. Aquino into the Presidency. Rather, it was the mili-
tary crisis between Marcos and his long-term ally, Defense Minister 
Juan Ponce Enrile, who reportedly has been entertaining presidential 
aspirations for some time (though currently he disclaims such ambi-
tions).18 Whether Enrile, as Marcos contends, saw his chance and de-
cided to overthrow Marcos as the clamor, especially abroad, began to 
mount in the aftermath of the tainted February 7 Presidential election, 
or whether Marcos, perhaps suspecting a coup, preemptively decided 
to strike against his Defense Minister first, will not be known for some 
time. But in the ensuing power play between Enrile and Marcos, 
which ended, it will be recalled, with the President leaving the country 
after a seemingly unwinnable and bloodless stalemate, Mrs. Aquino 
appears to have figured only marginally. 
Subsequently, Enrile revealed that, during his defiance of Marcos 
in the tense days of February 22-25, 1986, his support for Corazon 
Aquino was only his (Enrile's) third option. He initially preferred es-
tablishing a "revolutionary council" or, secondly, some sort of "peo-
ple's committee," involving prominent personalities, among them 
clergy and labor leaders. He abandoned these ideas after consulting, 
during his confrontation with Marcos, with his (Emile's) ally, then 
Philippine Constabulary Chief, and presently Armed Forces Com-
mander, General Fidel Ramos. It became apparent to him, Enrile 
said, that it might not seem wise for "ourselves in the military organi-
zation" to be seen establishing a "people's committee." 19 Instead, it 
was decided to take what one Enrile supporter later called the "com-
plete civilian route." Thus, contact with an agreement to forge a gov-
ernment headed by Aquino and Laurel was made-provided Enrile 
retained his position as Secretary of Defense. The latter condition was 
accepted by Aquino with some reluctance, considering Enrile's status 
as a longtime Marcos "crony." 
To be sure, a major turn in the rebellion against Marcos was the 
gathering of thousands of Manilans, who, mobilized by their clergy, 
labor, and student leaders, interposed themselves as a human wall on 
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (commonly called "EDSA") between 
Marcos' tanks and Enrile's and Ramos' rebel headquarters at Camp 
Crame. In the end, though, it was not the "miracle on EDSA" ( as 
many Manilans now dub this episode) but Enrile's defiance, backed by 
his own crack military units at Crame, and the entreaties of U.S. offi-
18. Asiaweek (Hongkong), July 13, 1986, pp. 10-15; The Economist (London), July 12, 
1986, p. 30. 
19. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, May 9, 1986, in FBIS, May 9, 1986, p. P4. 
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cials who urged Marcos to avoid a bloody confrontation, that forced 
the President to back down. Enrile and Ramos, calculating the align-
ment of forces at play, were shrewd enough, at the time, to accept 
(and, perhaps in Enrile's case, also make use of) Mrs. Aquino's un-
doubted personal popularity as symbol of a widely desired, fresh polit-
ical beginning for the Philippines. However, all this is not the same as 
saying that Mrs. Aquino, as a result of the February 7 elections, or 
even because of the "miracle on EDSA," necessarily had acquired a 
personal constitutional mandate to be President. 
That Mrs. Aquino nevertheless acquired the aura of such a man-
date was the result of a widespread public sense of relief that bloody 
chaos had been avoided, and also of a realization, both in the Philip-
pines and abroad, especially in the United States, that the practical 
exigencies of government and international relations demanded at 
least some sort of government in the Philippines. Much of the Philip-
pine judiciary readily recognized this reality, thus further legitimizing 
Aquino. For example, in adjudicating one lawsuit seeking clarification 
of Marcos' claim to the Presidency, a new, Aquino-appointed Philip-
pine Supreme Court ruled in mid-October 1986, that Mrs. Aquino was 
the legitimate Philippine President "as reflected in the collective judge-
ment" of the Filipino people and by virtue of "recognition" of her 
regime by other nations. 20 Just how that Filipino "collective judg-
ment" could be reconciled with the Philippine constitution at the time 
of the February 7, 1986 Presidential election, and with the decision of 
the Batasang Pambansa of February 15, 1986 ruling on that election, 
was not revealed by this Supreme Court judgment. The Court appar-
ently also chose to sidestep the question of whether international rec-
ognition of a particular national regime necessarily overrides any 
question of its legitimacy under that nation's own municipal law, or by 
what process that law had been properly superseded. 
There were other aspects of U.S. policy toward Marcos and the 
February 7, 1986 Presidential election that had a troubling effect on 
Mrs. Aquino's new position. Philippine elections, whether national or 
local, and whether before or after Marcos' imposition of martial law in 
1972, have a long history of fraud and violence. 21 One may laud the 
U.S. government's decision-for the first time in Philippine history-
to observe Marcos' "snap" election of February 7, 1986. Having 
goaded Marcos into calling the election and testing his legitimacy by a 
20. The New York Times, October 27, 1986, p. 3, col. I. 
21. M. Aurora Carboneli-Catilo, J.H. De Leon, and Eleanor E. Nicolas, Manipulated 
Elections (College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 
1986). 
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constant and unprecedented stream of official Cassandra-like warnings 
and criticism of his regime (a process further encouraged perhaps by 
CIA director Casey's suggestion), the United States now had the ad-
ded opportunity to discredit Marcos further. 
For anyone familiar with the Filipino political power structure 
and the functioning of the well-oiled political machine Marcos had 
built since coming to office in 1965, it is difficult to believe that election 
malversations rivalling anything the old city boss politics in the United 
States could reveal, would not now be rediscovered in the Philippines 
in the election of February 7, 1986. Was the decision to send a U.S. 
observer team part of that "well orchestrated policy of incentives and 
disincentives" to bring Marcos down, as outlined by a previously cited 
National Security Council analysis issued more than a year earlier? 
One may only speculate as to the answer at this point. The subse-
quent U.S. denunciations of the February 7 election fraud, however, 
have a rather hollow ring, as discussed above. The most recent gen-
eral elections in the Philippines that were held before the Presidential 
poll of February 7, 1986 took place on May 14, 1984. These were the 
elections for the Batasang Pambansa, the country's unicameral na-
tional legislature. There was extensive partisan campaigning in this 
1984 election. Even so, few observers doubted that Marcos' "New 
Society Movement" or Kilusan Bagong Lipunan-KBL) would win a 
resounding victory, in view of the President's effective hold on his na-
tion's local government elite and bureaucracy. And yet, parties in op-
position to the KBL won 61 of the 183 seats in this 1984 Batasang 
election, a significant increase from the 16 seats they had held in the 
previous legislature. Moreover, principal KBL leaders and Marcos 
confidants, including four cabinet ministers, lost their seats. Jaime 
Cardinal Sin, a frequent Marcos critic, characterized these May 1984 
elections "as the cleanest and most honest since martial law" had been 
imposed in 1972, and indeed "among the best since World War II." 
Nevertheless there had been fraud and extensive KBL bribery of vot-
ers, although "many people took the money and T -shirts offered but 
voted to a large extent as they wished."22 
Against such a background, characterizations of the relative 
"honesty" or fraudulence of the 1984 Batasang, or of any other Fili-
pino elections for that matter, become suspect. Of course, the coun-
try's own political culture and standards must be considered. One 
22. Herbert S. Malin, "The Philippines in 1984. Grappling with Crisis," Asian Survey, 
February, 1985, pp. 198-205, and Asia Yearbook 1985 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Hongkong, 1985), p. 228. 
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example may illustrate the point. On February 19, 1986, well after 
furtious criticism at home and abroad had erupted over the fraud per-
petrated during the Marcos-Aquino Presidential election twelve days 
earlier, a spokesman for the Philippine Constabulary, the national po-
lice, attempted to put matters in context. He declared that, according 
to official tabulations, 130 persons had been killed in election-related 
violence during the 1984 Batasang elections. In the internationally 
more publicized and controversial February 7, 1986 Marcos-Aquino 
Presidential contest, however, "only" 91 such deaths had been 
counted: 43 of them of KBL supporters, 24 followers of Aquino, and 
the others of undetermined political affiliation. 23 General Fidel Ra-
mos, Enrile's ally in the anti-Marcos rebellion of February 22-25, who 
subsequently was appointed Philippine Armed Forces Chief by presi-
dent Aquino, had sounded a similar note on February 4, 1986, just 
three days before the Presidential poll. Ramos said that there were 
"far fewer" deaths during the 1986 Marcos-Aquino Presidential cam-
paign than in 1984, when the "unofficial" count of election-related 
deaths had reached 2,000. 24 
Could there have been as many as 2,000 violent deaths (not to 
speak of other malversations) during the 1984 Batasang elections? 
There were no criticisms in the U.S. or other foreign press about these 
1984 Philippine elections, nor does one recall alarmed voices being 
raised in the U.S. administration or Congress. Was the February 7, 
1986 Presidential election relatively "cleaner" and even more "hon-
est" than the Batasang election of 1984? One could hesitate to say so, 
even if some common agreement on a yardstick to make such judg-
ments could be found. But what, then, is the justification for question-
ing the certification on February 16, 1986 by that same 1984 elected 
Batasang that Ferdinand Marcos was the duly reelected President of 
the Philippines? 
To focus on ballot fraud, voter intimidation and violence in the 
February 7, 1986 Philippine Presidential election in order to "delegi-
timize" Marcos, when such malversations have characterized all 
Philippino national elections to date, is to raise the disquieting spectre 
of having to delegitimize all previously elected Philippine Presidents. 
Whether, henceforth, the United States should or should not feel obli-
gated to send election observer teams and officially pronounce on the 
winner in future Philippine polls is difficult to answer. To add to all 
23. Agence France Presse desptach, Manila, March 4, 1986, in FBIS, March 5, 1986, 
p. Pl. 
24. Agence France Presse despatch, February 4, 1986, in FBIS, February 4, 1986, p. 
PIS. 
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this a "legitimization" of Mrs. Aquino on the basis of the dubious 
Namfrel vote count is only to entangle the knot of constitutionality 
even further. 
Perhaps worse, to brush aside pointed press reminders of analo-
gous situations in other parts of the world is to undermine seriously 
any moral basis for the U.S. campaign against Marcos. 
For example, in June 1986, Reagan Administration officials de-
clared that the United States had "conclusive evidence" of extensive 
fraud in the 1984 Presidential election in Panama, including an unlaw-
ful overturning of the results of that election on orders of the Panama-
nian army commander, the country's current strongman, General 
Manuel Noriega. Reminded by the press of the recent situation in the 
Philippines in this connection, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz 
justified continuing U.S. policy of support for Noriega by noting that: 
(a) an official Panamanian commission had certified the election re-
sults and the United States would "try to work with the government 
that emerged" (shades of the Batasang's certification of Marcos!); and, 
(b) with reference to the Panamanians: "It's their election not our 
election. We don't go around the world certifying elections."25 Shultz 
added that the situation in the Philippines had been different because 
Filipinos had "expressed themselves" about their 1986 election "very 
forcefully." From the latter statement the unwary might conclude 
that "forceful expression," henceforth, would be a U.S. criterion for 
political recognition and legitimacy. 
To be sure, Mrs. Aquino and her advisers were mindful of the 
questions surrounding the legitimacy of her assumed Presidential posi-
tion. However, her attempts to assert legitimacy by means other than 
another new and less tainted Presidential election have become the 
target of new criticisms. Aquino promulgated "proclamation no. 5, " 
an interim, so-called "Freedom Constitution" (March 25, 1986) on the 
basis of "the sovereign mandate of the people."26 This term-in light 
of constitutional events-was perceived by many as more in the nature 
of a rhetorical or political conceit, rather than as a well-grounded 
claim in then existing public law. 
The issue also raised again with additional force the question (see 
below) of whether Mrs. Aquino would not be better served by for-
mally proclaiming a "revolutionary government," instead of seeking to 
maintain a basis of legitimacy in a controversial election or in the 
"Miracle on EDSA" mass demonstration. In fact, the interim "Free-
25. The New York Times, June 24, 1986, p. A 7, col. 1. 
26. Manila Bulletin, March 26, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, March 28, 1986, p. Pl. 
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dom Constitution" (article 1, section 1) provided that the President, 
until the election of a new legislature under a new popularly ratified 
constitution, also would "continue to exercise legislative power." 
Further controversy soon arose over the proposed new permanent 
Constitution drafted by a special Aquino-appointed Commission. The 
provisions of this new charter were announced on October 12, 1986. 
Under section 7 of this new Constitution's "Transitory Provisions," 
Aquino's term as "incumbent President" is "hereby extended to noon 
of June 30, 1992Y But even such pro-Aquino political leaders as 
Homobono Adaza asserted that since Aquino in effect earlier had 
abolished the 1973 Constitution under which she had run, and there-
fore implicitly had declared a "revolutionary" regime, her present 
Presidential term should end when a regular constitutional govern-
ment assumed office. Hence Adaza, among others, argued that Mrs. 
Aquino was required to seek a fresh Presidential mandate (assuming 
she wished to do so) under the new Constitution that she had helped 
to foster. 28 
Juan Ponce Enrile, perhaps Aquino's sharpest critic, as well as 
some respected Philippine constitutional commentators, also adopted 
this point of view. Enrile in particular stressed an alleged "Catch-22" 
anomaly in Mrs. Aquino's position, pointing out that she had been 
sworn in as President for a six-year term under the Marcos-approved 
Constitution of 1973, a document which she now in effect had repudi-
ated.29 Meanwhile, even though she had proclaimed the interim 
"Freedom" Constitution on March 25, 1986, and then endorsed the 
ConCom's draft of a new Constitution, Mrs. Aquino based the legiti-
macy of her Presidential powers on the 1973 Constitution. To those 
who asked her whether she regarded the February 2, 1987 plebiscite 
on the new Constitution as being, in effect, a referendum on her own 
Presidency, she invariably replied "no," adding that "when the people 
voted" in the February 7, 1986 Presidential election "they knew it was 
for a term of six years. They did not think the term was just for a 
while. That's very, very, clear." 
However, the partisan intensity aroused by the issue of Mrs. 
Aquino's constitutional legitimacy is unlikely to evaporate, even after 
plebiscitary approval of the new Constitution. One may be skeptical 
27. New Day (Quezon City), October 13, 1986, pp. 9-13, in FBIS, October 17, 1986, p. 
P45. 
28. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, October 13, 1986, in FBIS, October 14, 
1986, p. P14. 
29. See Enrile's Manila interview with Karen Elliott House, in The Wall Street Jour-
nal, October 21, 1986, p. 36. 
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about Enrile's claim that, when he and Ramos and their followers ac-
cepted Mrs. Aquino as President upon Marcos' flight, "we did this on 
the assumption that they would organize a civil government in accord-
ance with the constitution existing at the time."30 In the face of all the 
criticism, Mrs. Aquino's own unrelenting refusal ever to run for an-
other Presidential term should give those convinced of her wide popu-
larity some pause. Moreover, what is one to think of the view of one 
of Aquino's closest advisers, her formal Local Government minister 
and current cabinet member, Aquilino Pimentel, who opposed the 
holding of a new Presidential election even after ratification of the new 
Constitution? Holding a Presidential election after a Constitutional 
ratification, Pimentel said, "would result in a fullscale bloodbath in the 
country," as it would create "deep cleavages" and "exacerbate" the 
"feelings of hatred" among the people, and, in any case, would ham-
per the country's economic recovery. 31 Great confidence in the polit-
ical, let alone constitutional, legitimacy of the Aquino government 
cannot be said to emanate from this assessment. 
II. NEW FACTIONS AND POLICY CONTROVERSIES 
The uncertainties that Mrs. Aquino and her advisers may have 
felt about the constitutional legitimacy of her position were augmented 
by various political factors. For one thing, Marcos, having refused to 
resign his Presidential office at the time he left the country on Febru-
ary 25, 1986, gave contradictory signals as to his intentions from his 
Honolulu exile. 32 In subsequent months, he alternately urged support 
for "the government of Madame Cory Aquino," and repeatedly de-
clared that he still was President of the Philippines. He almost cer-
tainly encouraged the pro-Marcos demonstrations that regularly have 
been held on Sunday in Manila's Rizal Park since his departure. In 
mid-May 1986, Secretary Shultz publicly rebuked Marcos for "caus-
ing trouble" for the Aquino government.33 Nevertheless, Marcos re-
portedly authorized and was repeatedly in telephone contact with his 
former Foreign Minister and 1986 Vice Presidential running mate, Ar-
turo Tolentino, during the latter's near-farcical two-day coup attempt 
staged at the Manila Hotel on July 6, 1986. 
30. Radio Veritas in Tagalog, October 2, 1986, in FBIS, October 3, 1986, p. P4. 
31. Business Day, September 26, 1986, p. 14, in FBIS, September 29, 1986, p. P6. 
32. There is the added complication that Marcos, when he left his Malacanan palace 
on February 25, 1986, probably was under the impression he was not being flown out of the 
country, but rather was being transported to his home in Ilocos Norte, Luzon. See Laxalt, 
"My conversations with Ferdinand Marcos," supra note II, at p. 3. 
33. The New York Times, Mary 14, 1986, p. I, col. 7. 
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In some measure, Marcos' persistence, and that of his followers, 
reflects not only the uncertainties of but also the contradictions in the 
Aquino government's constitutional position and early reform poli-
cies. More particularly, they also relate to the new government's rela-
tionship with the political establishment of the parties, and with the 
stalwarts and lesser elements of the old regime. Strictly speaking, 
these areas are matters of domestic Filipino politics, and U.S. officials 
have been loathe to intrude-at least too visibly. Yet, it is difficult for 
the Reagan Administration to back off now from Mrs. Aquino's gov-
erning problems, having done so much to assist her predecessor's 
political fall. Therefore, these problems deserve brief notice. 
As indicated above, the question of proclaiming a new "revolu-
tionary" government in order to provide a basis for the new govern-
ment soon came under review. Within hours after having formed her 
cabinet on February 27, 1986, Mrs. Aquino reportedly was studying 
the advisability of formally declaring such a "revolutionary govern-
ment." One popular Manila columnist declared exuberantly that 
Aquino's "revolutionary government" was bound neither by "any 
constitution nor any set of laws," and thus could "straighten out the 
mess." One of Aquino's chief advisers said in mid-March that her 
regime still was "under pressure" to declare itself "a revolutionary 
government" so as to be able to "dismantle" the "unjust structures" 
created by Marcos. 34 Aquino apparently already had chosen not to 
legitimize her position on the basis of the Batasang Pambansa's role in 
certifying Presidential elections under the existing 1973 Constitution. 
Her legitimization on this basis could have occurred by a new certifi-
cation vote of her status as President by the Batasang Pambansa. 
Although shortly after Marcos fled the country, 130 KBL members of 
the Batasang pledged support to Aquino that would have assured her 
certification as President in a new Batasang vote she rejected such sup-
port, declaring that "I do not believe people he actually terrorized and 
cheated. "35 
Mrs. Aquino may well have been repelled by the apparent polit-
ical cynicism of the 130 KBP Batasang members. She probably calcu-
lated that they were motivated less by a newly found loyalty to her and 
more by their interest in keeping both their positions and the existing 
Batasang in operation. But there also were 61 anti-Marcos opposition 
34. Benedicto David in Bulletin Today (Manila), March I, 1986, p. 6, in FBIS, March 
6, 1986, p. P9, Philippine News Agency despatch, March 17, 1986, in FBIS, March 18, 
1986, p. P4. 
35. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, March 4, 1986, in FBIS, March 5, 1986, 
p. Pl. 
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members. The net effect of Aquino's decision was to strengthen the 
authority of the chief executive and to signal an apparent unwilling-
ness to begin practicing the art of parliamentary politics. To some 
observers, neither of these two positions seemed calculated to 
strengthen a perception of a return to more democratic government, 
however such government may have become tainted in the modern 
Philippine experience. As noted, on March 25, 1986, Aquino issued 
by proclamation a new interim or "Freedom" Constitution. This doc-
ument, in article I section 3, effectively dissolved the Batasang 
Pambansa (elected in 1984 for a six-year term), and in article II sec-
tion 1, declared that "Until a legislature is convened under a new con-
stitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power."36 
All this meant, as Asia's leading news weekly put it, that the new Phil-
ippines of Aquino "now has no legislature at all: an unusual position 
for a popularly based regime. •m 
The interim Constitution strikes a high crusading tone. It de-
clares that, acting on a perceived people's "mandate," the President 
"shall give priority" to measures which, among others "completely re-
organize the government," eradicating "unjust and oppressive struc-
tures," and "all iniquitous vestiges" of the Marcos regime. But what 
that mandate amounted to in practice soon began to arouse bitter op-
position, both from members within Mrs. Aquino's own cabinet and 
party-based following, and from among the various constituencies of 
her pro-Marcos opponents. A change from the autocratic tenor of her 
predecessor's regime seemed not always easy to accomplish. For ex-
ample, on June 2, 1986, a 48-member Constitutional Commission-
provided for by the new interim Constitution-began its sessions. The 
"Concom" produced a new proposed permanent charter for the na-
tion, the provisions of which were announced with Aquino's approval 
on October 12, 1986. All "Concom" members, however, were ap-
pointed by Mrs. Aquino. When asked why "Concom" members could 
not be popularly elected in the "post-dictatorship" era of "people 
power," Aquino's new Justice Minister Neptali Gonzalez replied that 
popular election of the Constitutional Commission "May not necessar-
ily result in the election of the most qualified" persons capable of 
drafting "the best constitution possible."38 Such answers only man-
aged to deepen the disquiet of those who were beginning to fear that 
the advent of the Aquino government merely meant replacing one au-
tocracy with another. 
36. Manila Bulletin, March 26, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, March 28, 1986, p. Pl. 
37. Far Eastern Economic Review, April 3, 1986, p. 13. 
38. The New York Times, March 26, 1986, p. A3, col. 3. 
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Even more controversial and damaging to the democratic image 
she tried to project was Aquino's policy toward local government offi~ 
cials. On February 26, 1986, only hours after she had assumed Presi~ 
dential office, Mrs. Aquino first announced that local elections, 
scheduled for May that year, would be postponed. She blamed "un~ 
certainties and divisions" within the nation for her decision. Two days 
later, just after her cabinet had been appointed, Aquino's then Minis~ 
ter for Local Government, Aquilino Pimentel, announced the dis~ 
charge of some 220 provincial governors, majors and other local 
officials, even though most of these had been duly elected, and shortly 
would have faced reelection. Those discharged apparently were per~ 
ceived as unreliable Marcos loyalists, and their Aquino~appointed 
replacements, dubbed "Officers in Charge" (OIC), evidently were seen 
as essential to effect the eradication of "unjust and oppressive struc~ 
tures" promised by the new "Freedom" Constitution. 
The storm of protests and its consequences, which this decision to 
appoint OICs provoked, will be considered shortly. First, however, 
the new regime's decision to discharge local officials touched the nub 
of Mrs. Aquino's governing problems, and, indeed, was the core of her 
constitutional legitimacy, as well. During the more than two decades 
that he was the Philippines' chief executive, Marcos (1) skillfully built 
an effective local government machinery, oiled by affirmations of tradi~ 
tiona} local elite family privileges, by raw patronage power, political 
and financial favors, and by the virtually feudal pattern of mutual obli~ 
gations, control and protection prevailing in much of the countryside, 
and (2) through this machinery, was able repeatedly to have duly rati~ 
tied national constitutional government institutions and processes pro-
duce for him the desired results in various national referenda, 
constitutional changes and elections. More than one U.S. critic of 
these practices has heard a Filipino reply that his fellow countrymen 
learned their lessons of vote-count trickery and "boss" politics from 
their American mentors. 
Neither Aquino nor Pimentel probably foresaw, however, the ex~ 
tent of the outburst of opposition to the OIC appointments. In town 
afer town, mayors refused to surrender their offices, barricading them-
selves with their followers-including sympathetic local military-in 
their town halls: by mid-July 1986, one foreign reporter, after visting 
the Central Luzon region, reported that " in Ilocos Sur (province) 
none of the mayors from the Marcos time has handed over his post to 
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the officer in charge appointed by Mrs. Aquino. "39 In Mindanao and 
the Visayas, at least one pro-Marcos provincial governor and other 
local officials, together with several hundred members of their "private 
armies," reportedly "took to the hills" to lead a resistance and periodi-
cally kidnap foreign travellers in an obvious effort to embarrass the 
Aquino government. 
Also, Aquino supporters turned against her. One anti-Marcos 
Batasang member, Roy Padilla, sharply criticized the dismissal of lo-
cal officials and the cancellation of local elections as "showing dictato-
rial tendencies"; in the province of Tarlac, the provincial chairman of 
the Unido party (United Nationalist Democratic Organization)-the 
party under whose banner Aquino herself had run in the February 7, 
1986 Presidential election-resigned "in protest against the violations 
of laws by some ranking officials of the new government. "40 In fact, 
on March 5, Unido Secretary General Rene Espina, evidently with the 
approval ofUnido chairman Salvador Laurel-Aquino's running mate 
and currently Philippines Vice President and Foreign Minister-for-
mally declared that Unido was "distancing itself from the Aquino gov-
ernment" because the latter was "committing political slaughter 
among local officials."41 
Already on March 19, 1986, Aquino announced that she would 
have "the final say" in the new OIC appointments, but confusion and 
bitter controversy continued. Persons other than those designated in 
official government announcements reportedly were presenting them-
selves as OICs in several towns, a number of other designated OICs 
were found to be facing various legal charges, and in other instances 
"turncoat" KBL followers and other allegedly "opportunistic" former 
Marcos supporters suddenly appeared to have been designated as 
OICs under the Unido label.42 
Although Mrs. Aquino denounced what she termed the debase-
ment of national politics by the KBL, and though she seemed anxious 
to reform the political system by eradicating party favoritism and ri-
valries, the President's followers in her cabinet and in the government 
bureaucracies perceived the fall of Marcos as the usual "change of 
39. Richard West, "Still Faithful to Ferdinand," The Spectator (London), July 12, 
1986, p. 12. 
40. Times Journal (Manila), March 4, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, March 6, 1986, p. P11; The 
New York Times, March 1, 1986, p. 6, col. 1. 
41. PNA despatch, Manila, March 5, 1986, in FBIS, March 5, 1986, p. P4. 
42. The News Herald (Manila), June 11, 1986, p. 11, col. 7; The Philippine Tribune 
(Manila), June 6, 1986, p. 1, col. 6; Philippines Free Press (Manila), June 14, 1986, p. 14, 
col. 1. 
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guard" opportunity to ensconce themselves and their allies in positions 
of power. Sharp power struggles and a reportedly "mad scramble" for 
local offices broke out within days of Aquino's accession between Lau-
rel's Unido and Aquino's Laban party (Lakas Ng Bayan-"People's 
Power Movement"),43 which has been allied closely with Pimentel's 
own PDP or Philippine Democratic Party). There remained also a 
plethora of lesser parties, among them the pro-Aquino, left-liberal 
(with a following among reform-minded young professionals and busi-
nessmen) "Union for Democracy," and the Mindanao Alliance, was 
formed to lift the Southern Philippines' largest island out of its unde-
veloped and strife-tom state. Marcos loyalists and others disaffected 
with the new Aquino regime found a new rallying point in the Partido 
Nacionalista ng Philipinas (PNP), led by Bias Ople, Marcos' former 
Labor Minister. During the second half of 1986, under Pimentel's di-
rection, and despite Aquino's and Laurel's strictures, PDP-Laban 
stalwarts continued to be pushed as much as possible for local govern-
ment positions. The resentment this process provoked among incum-
bents and their own respective local clients and supporters was 
aggravated further by (a) charges of allegedly left leaning political ide-
ologies of some of the new OIC appointees, and (b) by the new OICs' 
incompetence and/or lack of experience. Instances of fake OIC ap-
pointment letters, issued with the alleged connivance of former Com-
munist party chairman Jose M. Sison, added still more fuel to the 
controversy.44 
In the deepening political controversy during this period between 
Enrile and his Army supporters on the one hand, and Aquino on the 
other, the issue of the OIC replacements was drawn ever deeper into 
the larger question of whether Mrs. Aquino could deal effectively with 
the Communist problem. In mid-October 1986, Enrile submitted a 
number of requested policy changes to Aquino. Among these was the 
removal of "undesirable" or "unpopular" OICs, and their replacement 
by local leaders more acceptable to the population, whether or not 
these such leaders were or had been Marcos adherents.45 On October 
22, 1986, Aquino announced that she would institute a "purge" 
among appointed OIC, as "quite a few" of them had "fallen way be-
low our expectations. "46 The views of her Armed Forces Com-
mander, General Fidel Ramos, may well have been decisive for Mrs. 
43. Business Day (Manila), March 3, 1986, p. 12, in FBIS, March 5, 1986, P. PIS. 
44. The Manila Times, October 20, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, October 21, 1986, p. P8. 
45. Business Day, October 23, 1986, p. 24, in FBIS, October 24, 1986, p. Pl. 
46. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, October 22, 1986, in FBIS, October 23, 
1986, p. P4. 
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Aquino. Late in October 1986, Ramos, in an implicit criticism of Pi-
mentel's policies, said that some of the newly appointed OIC had been 
obstructing the coordination between military and civilian officials 
who were needed to deal more effectively with the problem of the 
Communist insurgency.47 
Just how far the promised OIC "purge," in fact, would be carried 
out remained an open question-and a continuing source of public 
controversy--during subsequent months. At the time of the Novem-
ber 23, 1986 reshuffle of Aquino's cabinet (which saw Enrile depart as 
Defense Minister, but Pimentel remain as the President's "adviser on 
national affairs" with cabinet rank), Pimentel's political objective 
seemed to have been accomplished to a considerable degree. As one of 
Aquino's cabinet ministers at the time of the cabinet reshuffle told the 
correspondent of Asia's leading news weekly, Pimentel "already has 
done the hard work in planting PDP-Laban appointees around the 
country." He added that Pimentel "can now watch" his replacement 
as Local Government Minister, PDP-Laban member Jaime Ferrer, a 
former Elections Commission Chairman, "guard the fort."48 All this 
suggested that the Aquino regime, far from marking a break with the 
corrupt practices of political manipulation of the era of Marcos and 
his predecessors, very much was insuring that its own manipulative 
machinery was being installed during its tenure in power-particularly 
in time for the February 2, 1987 plebiscite on the new Constitution 
and the subsequent Congressional elections. 
Indeed, what quickly became apparent from the inter-party feud-
ing over the OIC question and other political controversies in the 
Aquino era was that, at the end of "the dictatorship" (as the Marcos 
period now customarily is referred to in the Philippines), and whatever 
fate the new and presumably less "unjust and oppressive structures" of 
government which the Constitutional Commission and the Philippine 
electorate would approve, the traditional patterns of modern Filipino 
political culture would not easily be dislodged. Pessimists tended· to 
see in the cacaphony of political opinion and mutual recrimination 
that attended the advent of the Aquino era less the emergence of a new 
era of freedom for the Philippines and more a return to the less inhib-
ited partisan infighting and media exuberance of the pre-Marcos era. 
With new national legislative elections scheduled for May 11, 1987, 
there had come during the second half of 1986 an eruption of new 
47. The New York Times, November 1, 1986, p. 4. 
48. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 18, 1986, p. 14. 
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parties and factional divisions.49 The fate of Laurel's Unido, in a 
seemingly PDP-Laban-dominated government; of the old, once pow-
erful, but now badly split Liberal Party; of the revived Enrile-oriented 
Nacionalistas; and, of such newer, leftist groups as the fellow-travel-
ling People's Party (Partido ng Bayan) led by former Communist 
Party chairman Jose Sison, might have enlivened the political discus-
sions in Manila coffeeshops. They also may have enhanced the im-
pression of a climate of political freedom, as did the appearance of half 
a dozen new dailies in and around the capital. But whether--consid-
ering the political scene in the years before Marcos-all this added up 
to a national format of sustained political stability that would make 
accelerated and much needed economic development possible, re-
mained very much in doubt. 
Certainly, the new February, 1987 Constitution will provide 
abundant opportunity for political jousting and strife. There is, for 
example, provision for a bicameral legislature with different terms of 
office for its members, as well as an electoral system that, during its 
first three sessions, will have representatives from different "sectors" 
of society (e.g. the peasantry, women, organized labor). The electoral 
system also will provide for party list appointments and for direct elec-
toral district balloting. This complex system, though ostensibly 
designed to diffuse the power of major parties, including those that are 
government-led, seems likely to provide the opportunity for making 
Philippine politics even more of a full time preoccupation than it was 
in the past. Critics note that, of the new Constitution's 321 provi-
sions-the most numerous of any of the country's charters-99 are 
qualified by such phrases as: "as may be provided by law," or "as 
Congress may provide."50 In other words, the partisan political pro-
cess of the future has yet to define much of the content and scope of 
the nation's new fundamental law. This should make for a particu-
larly lively environment in the drafting of public policy. And though 
as a reaction to the political constraints and abuses of the Marcos era, 
the diffusion of the electoral system under the new Constitution may 
seem understandable, one wonders if all this is likely to enhance the 
country's attraction to foreign investors. 
Meanwhile, new opportunities for debilitating political wheeling 
and dealing were opened as the Commission on Good Government of 
the Aquino regime first began "sequestering" (i.e. impounding) the 
properties of the Marcos family and their many close business and 
49. Asiaweek, November 2,1986, p. 16. 
50. Ibid., October 26, 1986, p. 26. 
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political associates and, later, for various legal and/or political rea-
sons, began releasing those properties to their original owners or 
agents. At the same time, from within her own political constituency, 
Mrs. Aquino was being castigated for reappointing Jose Fernandez 
and Cesar Zalamea, respectively, as Governor of the Central Bank and 
as Chairman of the development Bank of he Philippines, despite, as 
Unido Secretary General Rene Espina put it, "their known deep in-
volvement in the web of corruption of the Marcos regime."51 
On all of these less than promising developments in the Aquino 
era the United States tried to place as good a face as possible, adopting 
essentially a "let's wait till the dust settles" and a "let's think posi-
tively" kind of official attitude. Then, as in the second half of 1986, 
the conflict between Mrs. Aquino and her Defense Minister Juan 
Ponce Enrile deepened, and rumors of a plot to overthrow Mrs. 
Aquino began flying thick and fast, the Reagan Administration's rep-
resentatives repeatedly and openly reaffirmed their support for Mrs. 
Aquino. Washington also reportedly brought pressure to bear on En-
rile to cease his steady criticism of Mrs. Aquino. 
As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, John C. Monjo, had said to a U.S. House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on May 15, 1986, the Philippines under Mrs. Aquino 
faced "several formidable political tasks." Not least among these 
tasks were "working effectively with the sometimes competing polit-
ical forces within her government" and "dealing constructively" with 
the supporters of the former Marcos regime. But, Monjo asserted, 
Aquino "enjoys broad popular support," and her accession to power 
"constitutes a setback" for the Communist insurgency. Citing Secre-
tary of State George Shultz, Monjo added that he too felt certain that 
the Philippines' problems "are on the way to being solved."52 Less 
than three weeks later, however, in hearings before the U.S. Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary for De-
fense, Richard Armitage, seemed more pessimistic. He declared, inter 
alia, that the Communist rebels had grown stronger and more violent 
since Mrs. Aquino's call for a cease-fire. He added that the Philippine 
army continued to be "handicapped by inadequate resources. The 
military situation is serious and getting worse."53 
Such contrasting assessments appeared to mirror the divisive con-
51. The New Philippines Daily Express (Manila), March 27, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, March 
28, 1986, p. Pl2. 
52. John C. Monjo, "US Assistance to the Philippines," Current Policy, no. 834 (U.S. 
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1986), pp. 1-4. 
53. The Honolulu Advertiser, June 4, 1986, p. I, col. 2. 
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troversies within the Aquino regime, fed further by the sharper criti-
cisms voiced by Enrile. A feeling that, despite good intensions, the 
Aquino regime was too internally divided and too weak to establish 
simultaneously effective government authority and take sustained na-
tional economic development in hand, was reflected in a persistent 
lack of business confidence in the Aquino regime, both on the part of 
U.S. and Filipino investors. The significance of the remark made by 
U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on June 25, 1986, during a Ma-
nila visit, that he was "bullish about the Philippines," quickly was de-
valuated by the Philippines' own leading financial daily, Business Day. 
Business Day noted that, despite such assurances by Shultz, American 
foreign investors "do not share his view": 
Members of the private sector recently invited to the US who 
met with ranking American officials and businessmen got the 
impression that American business is not ready to invest in 
the Philippines. "They always asked the bottom line ques-
tion: Is President Aquino up to the job?" A leading corpo-
rate figure told Business Day: "They want to see progress 
first before they put in their money."54 
U.S. and other foreign investors were not the only ones to con-
tinue to entertain doubts about "the bottom line question." Filipino 
business circles also seemed to be skeptical. On June 4, 1986, in an 
address on the Philippine situation before the U.S. Foreign Policy As-
sociation in New York, Secretary of State Shultz had said that "We 
are beginning to see the first signs that the confidence of domestic in-
vestors is firming up," that the recession begun in 1983 was "bottom-
ing out," and that "projections are for a resumption of positive 
growth" during the rest of 1986.55 If Filipino domestic investors were 
showing new signs of confidence, however, Mrs. Aquino, for one, ap-
peared to be unaware of it. On the contrary, on July 21, 1986, she 
castigated Filipino and foreign business leaders for their continuing 
"wait and see attitude," charging that the support they had pledged to 
her new administration "has not been forthcoming." It was noted in 
fact that, since the advent of President Aquino's Administration, "a 
hoped for upturn in business activity and investment has not material-
ized." Aquino told the business community flatly: "You complain of 
uncertainty, and I am telling you that it is uncertain because you are 
uncommitted," even though she claimed that the exchange rate had 
54. Business Day (Quezon City), June 26, 1986, p. 28, col. I. 
55. George Shultz, "Reform in the Philippines and American Interests," Current Pol-
icy, no. 842, June 4, 1986, p. 4. 
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been stabilized, and inflation had been brought under control. 56 
The ceaseless drumfire of debilitating charges of Emile-ranging 
from his assertion that the government's peace talks with the Commu-
nist insurgents were futile and dangerous, and that Communists in-
deed had infiltrated the Aquino government, to a barely veiled 
accusation that Aquino's regime had fallen victim to corruption, and 
his demand that such ministers as Aquilino Pimentel be ousted from 
the cabinet57-all aroused deep U.S. concern. Key members of the 
U.S. House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Subcommitte on Asian 
and Pacific Affairs warned late in October 1986 that if Emile was not 
actually trying to overthrow Aquino, his criticisms and seeming defi-
ance of government policy reportedy were "undermining the image of 
stability that the Philippines needs to attract foreign investment. " 58 
Earlier, on October 6, 1986, Under Secretary of State Michael H. 
Armacost felt it necessary to emphasize that "high purposes" were 
"beginning to demonstrate concrete and positive results," that Mrs. 
Aquino had "earned a mandate from the Philippine people," and that 
the Reagan Administration, along with its aid, was "actively encour-
aging" private "equity investment" in the Philippines. 59 Meanwhile, 
U.S. Ambassador in the Philippines, Stephen Bosworth, also asserted 
that the United States supported that Aquino government "completely 
and unequivocally," and that he wouldn't touch with "a ten foot pole" 
the question of whether the Reagan Administraiton would be equally 
supportive of a government headed by Emile or Aquino's Vice Presi-
dent, Salvador Laurel. Laurel was another, if more restrained, critic 
of Aquino during this period.60 
Yet, even after the November 23, 1986 ministerial reshuffle and 
Enrile's departure from the cabinet, uneasiness over the Aquino gov-
ernment's future stability scarcely appeared to have dissipated, includ-
ing in U.S. "equity investment" circles. For one thing, covert U.S. 
intervention in the Enrile-Aquino crisis probably did Mrs. Aquino's 
Presidency little good. According to a leading Manila daily, "highly 
placed" Philippine military sources had disclosed that days before a 
rumored coup attempt to topple Aquino on November 22, 1986, vet-
56. The New York Times, July 22, 1986, p. D13, col. 3. 
57. See, e.g., Manila Far East Broadcasting Company Report, August 11, 1986, in 
FBIS, August 12, 1986, p. P7; Business Day (Manila), September 16, 1986, p. 20, in FBIS, 
September 17, 1986, p. P4; The Manila Times, October 30, 1986, pp. 1, 6. 
58. The New York Times, October 28, 1986, p. 12. 
59. Michael H. Armacost, "The Philippines and the United States," Current Policy, 
(U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.) n. 876, pp. 1-4. 
60. Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1986, pt. 1, p. 1. 
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eran U.S. diplomat Philip Habib secretly was sent by the Reagan Ad-
ministration to Manila to foil the rumored plot. Ambassador 
Bosworth similarly was criticized by the same Philippine circles for 
"manipulating and intervening" in Philippine domestic affairs. 61 The 
continued evident approbation of Aquino in leading U.S. media and 
by the U.S. administration in Washington brought about a rare coa-
lescing of the Left and the Right in nationalist Philippine reaction to 
such alleged U.S. influence in Philippine affairs. 
Although for the time being, restive coup-minded elements in En-
rile's Defense Ministry's security force had been effectively thwarted 
by Armed Forces Chief Ramos from proceeding further with plans to 
replace Aquino, their grievances against the regime remained. The 
chief result of the much publicized "mass" cabinet resignations on No-
vember 23 had been the removal of Enrile. To be sure, the heads of 
two other ministries, natural resources and public works, who also had 
been criticized by the military for their lacklustre performance, also 
were replaced. But, Aquilino Pimentel and Augusto Sanchez, the cab-
inet's leading leftists, whose removal reportedly had been urged by top 
Army generals, stayed on after Enrile left. 
It was not until further pressure from the military and business 
supporters that Aquino, in mid-December 1986, agreed to Sanchez' 
resignation. Aquino, evidently, feared adverse reaction from more 
militant labor leaders with whom Sanchez in particular had been al-
lied. She also seemed unwilling to antagonize her liberal supporters 
among whom human rights activist Pimentel was popular. Subse-
quent public and partisan controversy over Sanchez' replacement 
again indicated the deepening Left-Right polarization in the country. 
Meanwhile, the much publicized 60-day cease-fire between the 
Communist insurgents and the Philippine armed forces, which went 
into effect on December 10, 1986, soon was marred by mutual recrimi-
nations and reciprocal charges of continuing violent clashes and re-
ports of killings and ambushes. The Communist strategy of entering 
into cease-fire and peace talks with the Aquino government seemed to 
some observers to be actuated more by tactical considerations to pro-
vide a breathing space for the NP A guerrillas and by the opportunity 
for united front building of the party's mass base, rather than by an 
abandonment of its program of violent revolution.62 On December 28, 
61. The Manila Times, November 26, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, November 26, 1986, p. P7. 
62. See, e.g., Clayton Jones, "Filipino Left's Truce Strategy," The Christian Science 
Monitor, December I, 1986, pp. I, 64. See also Justus M. van der Kroef, "Aquino and 
Beyond: Philippine Communist Strategies," Internationales Asian Forum, 1986, no. 3-4, 
pp. 215-234. 
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1986, Armed Forces Chief Fidel Ramos declared that on the basis of 
captured documents, the Communist party of the Philippines consid-
ered the cease-fire to be a means of advancing its activities in armed 
united front and parliamentary struggles. He singled out the newly 
formed Partido ng Bayan (People's Party) as part of these Communist 
tactics. Certainly, the party's National Democratic Front (NDF) 
threw itself with gusto into a propaganda campaign as its representa-
tives appeared on TV talk shows, held frequent interviews, and even 
opened an "information office" in Manila's National Press Club build-
ing, a mile from the Presidential palace. 
In the discussions between representatives of the Aquino govern-
ment and the NDF, meanwhile, the latter's demands-an end to U.S. 
bases' rights and to "unequal" treaties with the United States, and 
sweeping agrarian and other economic reforms-hardly seemed calcu-
lated to reassure the business community, domestic or foreign. Vari-
ous groups within the Armed Forces, including an organization 
calling itself "The Association of Young Lieutenants, Captains and 
Majors of the Armed Forces of the Philippines," openly criticized the 
government for its allegedly "hurriedly forcing" of a cease-fire with 
the Communists, "just for the heck of attaining peace."63 Patterns of 
political violence, long endemic in the Philippines, also appeared to 
engulf foreign business and technical personnel in the country. On 
November 15, 1986, only two days after Aquino had returned from 
discussions in Tokyo designed to draw Japanese investment interest to 
the Philippines, a prominent Japanese businessman was abducted just 
outside Manila; three weeks earlier two South Korean engineers work-
ing in Ilocos Norte had been kidnapped, and the Communist New 
People's Army in the region in a possibly spurious letter demanded 
release of prominent NP A cadres in exchange. The murder of leftist 
labor leader Rolando Olalia on November 12, perhaps by a military-
connected, "private army" death squad, was followed a week later by 
the NPA's admitted killing of David Puzon, a close associate of Enrile 
and a prominent political figure in Kalinga-Apayo. 64 
Amidst all this violence, the impression that Aquino was and will 
be unable to rally a political "Center" broad and firm enough to hold 
both the Left and the Right at bay, and to sustain a national develop-
ment program of some duration, was accentuated by disquieting pro-
63. The New Philippines Daily Express, December 4, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, December 5, 
1986, p. P4. 
64. See. e.g., Radyo ng Bayan, Quezon City, November 7, 1986, in FBIS, November 7, 
1986, p. P13; Ibid., November 21, 1986, in FBIS, November 25, 1986, p. PIO; The Boston 
Globe, November 17, 1986, p. 3. 
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nouncements and policies of some of Aquino's ministers. Since 
Aquino's rise to power, there has been a marked upsurge in labor un-
rest, including strikes, in which the government, mindful of its left-
wing constituency, has been unwilling or unable to intervene. The 
government's new wage order decision announced on May 1, 1986, 
consolidated all workers' allowances as part of basic wages. The mea-
sure was widely criticized as severely costly to them by the influential 
Employers Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP). ECOP's spokes-
memo warned that the decision could lead to massive retrenchments 
and layoffs, particularly in export industries. They added that 
Aquino's allegedly pro-labor policies generally were viewed in the 
business community as an "act of ingratitude on the part of the Presi-
dent," considering the support which ECOP members had given her 
in her struggle against Marcos.65 To be sure, later in 1986, the initially 
inflammatory rhetoric of Aquino's then Labor Minister, Augusto 
Sanchez, who in the early weeks of the new administration inveighed 
against "dirty capitalists" and "exploiters" and called for a new "equi-
table distribution of property and profit," was toned down. Indeed, as 
early as mid-August 1986, Aquino ordered the Labor Ministry to deal 
"more aggressively" with strikes, particularly those motivated by 
political considerations (e.g. in the Central Philippines, striking work-
ers of one firm demanding the dismantling of U.S. bases in the coun-
try). 66 But concern that radical unions, such as thos affiliated with the 
KMU or Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement) labor associa-
tion, continue to be infiltrated by the Communists, especially in the 
Metropolitan Manila area, had grown greatly by early 1987. Already 
in June 1986, former Defense Minister Enrile had warned of the "sus-
tained infiltration of labor union ranks" by the Philippine Commu-
nists. Enrile noted that the Trade Union Bureau of the Communist 
Party of the Philippines (CPP), whose insurgents continued to battle 
the Philippine armed forces and Constabulary despite Aquino's re-
peated call and efforts for a cease-fire, had stepped up its exploitation 
of labor-management conflicts. And he indicated to business groups 
that he was prepared to "identify" CPP labor fronts to business man-
agement groups on a confidential basis. 67 Since Enrile's departure 
from the cabinet, such revelations have ceased, and on this point alone 
65. The New Philippines Sunday Express (Manila), May 4, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, May 12, 
1986, p. P1l. 
66. The Straits Times, August 15, 1986, p. 8. 
67. The New Philippines Daily Express (Manila), June 26, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, June 30, 
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the Defense Minister's resignation may well tum out to have been a 
Pyrrhic political victory for Mrs. Aquino. 
Still, behind all the partisan wrangling, policy divisions, and con-
cerns over the economic climate in the country, there is perhaps a 
larger issue that is the root of the presently perceived instability. That 
issue is that a number of current institutions and organizations in the 
Philippines either were enabled to project their political power to a 
heretofore unexpected degree during the overthrow of Marcos and its 
aftermath, and/or have become directly more influential in shaping 
the future course of the nation. Four such contending power struc-
tures briefly will be considered here: (1) the Roman Catholic Church 
in the Philippines; (2) the Armed Forces; (3) the CPP and its 16,000-
man guerrilla force, the New People's Army (NPA); and, (4) the vari-
ous armed bands, ranging from the Muslim secessionist Moro Na-
tional Liberation Front (MNLF) to the so-called "private armies" of 
political leaders. All four of these power structures impact on the fu-
ture of the Aquino regime. Designing the formulas to accommodate, 
neutralize, and/or harness them to national Philippine development 
also is essential to the protection of U.S. security interests in the 
region. 
III. THE CHURCH AND THE MILITARY 
The Church-With little question, the February 7, 1986 Presiden-
tial election and the fall of Marcos, were high water marks in the 
politicization of Roman Catholicism in the Philippines, a Church to 
which some 80 percent of the country's 56 million inhabitants belong. 
The Vatican recognized this when on July 15, 1986, Pope John Paul U 
issued a strongly worded warning to the Bishops of the Philippines. 
The Pontiff expressed his misgivings about the Church's political ac-
tivism, and cautioned the Bishops to limit their activities to "the disin-
terested service of the common good."68 The Vatican's admonition 
was remarkable in that it was the first time in modem history that the 
Church's collective national leadership was taken to task. In the past, 
such warnings from the Holy See have been addressed to individual 
clergy. 
During the early Marcos era, a number of bishops and younger 
clergy had voiced sharp criticism of the government, and some 
younger priests eventually joined the Communists' New People's 
Army. During the February 7, 1986 Presidential contest, clergy deci-
sively intervened on behalf of Aquino's cause, and indeed, Jaime Car-
68. The New York Times, July 16, 1986, p. AS, col. 5. 
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dinal Sin played a major role in forging the Aquino-Laurel ticket at a 
time when it seemed that differences between the Laban and U nido 
parties would fatally split the opposition to Marcos. At least some 20 
Filipino bishops led by Bishop Francisco Claver of Malaybatay, re-
portedly fell under the sway of "Liberation Theology." They have 
urged a dynamic of class struggle in the Philippines without formal 
reference to Marxism and they counsel Filipino farmers to oppose 
their landlord "oppressors." "Conscientisation" has been the term 
used by these clerical activitists in seeking to bring their flocks to a 
militant political awareness. 69 
All this, combined with the consistent exposure by various clergy, 
including the Association of Religious Superiors in the Philippines, of 
"salvagings" (i.e. disappearances) and other human rights violations 
allegedly committed by Philippine military elements and by para-mili-
tary Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force units, sharpened the an-
tagonism between many Philippine military commanders and the 
Church, leading to military countercharges of clerical "subversive' 
collaboration with the Communists. These acts also sharpened antag-
onism between the Church and the Marcos administration. During 
the 1986 Presidential election campaign, hundreds of clergy, infor-
mally or openly, propagated Aquino's cause or were alleged to have 
worked with the pro-Aquino Namfrel in the vote counting. There 
were many KBL charges of blatantly pro-Aquino pressure on voters 
by the clergy and activists of the Church. Marcos himself, on U.S. 
television, claimed that "we have pictures" showing Philippino clergy 
"intimidating and coercing people."70 (One notes in passing that, 
while foreign media and election observers were quick to give credence 
to accusations of voting irregularities perpetrated by pro-Marcos sup-
porters, there was a notable lack of interest in tracking down the ve-
racity, if any, of these KBL-Marcos accusations.) Notwithstanding 
the questions that were raised about the accuracy of the Namfrel vot-
ing tabulation in the February 7 election, Cardinal Sin declared on 
February 11 that he had warned Marcos to stop attacking Namfrel, or 
he (Sin) would publicly denounce the President "as a liar.'m 
On February 14, 1986, a week after the Presidential election, the 
Phlippine Bishops Conference issued a statement which condemned 
the violence and irregularities of the election, warning that if "the gov-
69. Ian Buruma, "The Church Militant Takes On a New Meaning," Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, February 28, 1985, pp. 77-79. 
70. Times Journal (Manila), February 16, 1981, p. I, col. 3; The New York Times, 
February 15, 1986, p. I, col. 6. 
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ernment does not freely correct these crimes against the body politic, 
then it is up to the people to speak for themselves."72 Though the 
Bishops' statement eschewed "violent" or "bloody means," it was 
widely perceived as yet another pro-Aquino endorsement, and as vir-
tually condoning in advance the largely peaceful coup d'etat against 
Marcos. In the tense period between February 22 and 25, 1986, with 
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel Ramos openly 
defying Marcos, parish congregations in the Metropolitan Manila area 
were mobilized by sympathetic clergy. With priests and nuns dressed 
in clerical garb in the front ranks, the human wall of the "Miracle at 
EDSA" occurred. Meanwhile, the Catholic radio station "Veritas" 
was a major factor in rallying anti-Marcos public opinion in Manila. 
Since the accession of Mrs. Aquino to the Presidency on Febru-
ary 25, 1986, and despite the Vatican's criticism, the Church's political 
influence has never been higher. This influence has begun to arouse a 
strong, if still relatively muted, resentment in various political circles, 
to a degree not seen in a country with little or no history of the anti-
clericalism familiar to most of modern Catholic Europe or Latin 
America. The extent to which teachers and/or graduates of the pre-
mier Jesuit educational institution in the country, the Ateneo de Ma-
nila, have achieved political influence over the deeply devout Mrs. 
Aquino has led to unfavorable press reports. Such "Ateneans," as 
Ateneo President and "Concom" member Joaquin Bernas, Finance 
Minister Jaime Ongpin, and Presidential Assistant Ching de Leon-Es-
caler, are described as constituting "a tightknit, powerful group," joc-
ularly known as Aquino's "Council of Trent."73 
One may dismiss such pejorative reports, perhaps, or similar 
obiter dicta by the media (e.g. the senior columnist Teodoro Valencia's 
observation that "The only unity the priests want is unity between 
church and state . . . There are enough of them in the Constitutional 
Commission"). 74 But the spectacle of Cardinal Sin, during a 
Thanksgiving mass on March 2 in Manila's Rizal Park, making the 
"L" sign of Aquino's Laban party, and shouting "Cory! Cory!" to the 
assembled crowd of Aquino partisans, must give some pause to any 
observer of the present Filipino political scene. For Cardinal Sin these 
days to be called by Manila's more exuberant inhabitants "the unseen 
general," is not necessarily a guarantee of future political stability.75 
72. Philippines Daily Express, February 15, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, February 19, 1986, pp. 
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Moreover, despite the Vatican's strictures on political activity by 
Roman Catholic clergy, the Philippine Church leadership seems as 
openly politicized today as ever. On November 21, 1986, for example, 
the Bishops Conference of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philip-
pines formally issued a statement supporting the newly drafted Consti-
tution. This announcement was as the proposed new Charter became 
sharply controversial and came under a crossfire of attacks from such 
varied quarters as the Nacionalista Party, and other supporters of En-
rile, peasant organizations, constitutional lawyers, the Communist 
Party of the Philippines and its allies such as the KMU labor federa-
tion, and the new Partido ng Bayan (People's Party). In their state-
ment of support, the Bishops recognized that the new Constitution 
was "objectionable to some or many people." Still, they urged electo-
ral approval, because the document, in their view, was "consistent 
with Catholic teachings."76 Since some of the new Constitutional pro-
visions, such as the government's power to "sequester," i.e. seize prop-
erty, have been criticized as violative of the proposed new Charter's 
Bill of Rights by prominent Philippine Jesuit lawyers like Joaquin 
Bernas, a reputed close adviser of Mrs. Aquino and Concom mem-
ber, 77 such pronouncements on the consistency between the Constitu-
tion and Church teachings only can add to the political controversy. 
Church leaders' involvement in key Aquino government policies 
that are likely to be dubious threatens to draw the Church too far too 
into potentially disastrous outcomes of such policies. This, in turn, 
inevitably would weaken the Church's potential for future leadership 
in a new political crisis. An example is the Aquino government's truce 
negotiation with the Communists, which some Church leaders un-
equivocally has been endorsed. (Indeed, Bishop Antonio Fortich is 
Chairman of the National Ceasefire Commission or NCC, which 
monitors alleged truce violations.) Jaime Cardinal Sin expressed his 
own "strong conviction" that the December 10, 1986 government 
ceasefire agreement with the Communist insurgents "can and will 
hold."78 The Cardinal spoke at a time when the truce already had 
been violated half a dozen times in various armed clashes and weapons 
incidents, and when concern over the Communists' tactics of consoli-
dating their power during the truce period was mounting in military 
and political circles. Even those who sympathized with the Cardinal's 
exhortation that the truce was "our last chance" to avoid an eruption 
76. Kyodo despatch, Manila, November 21, 1986, in FBIS, November 25, 1986, p. 
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of more bloody conflict in the future questioned whether some Philip-
pine Church leaders were wise in believing, or pretending to believe, 
that the polarization of Left and Right in the Philippines had not al-
ready gone so far that its future dynamic could be halted or safely 
ignored. 
By the end of the year, there were some signs that Cardinal Sin 
too was beginning to feel some pangs of disappointment over the 
Aquino regime's performance. In a sharply worded pastoral letter in 
early December 1986, the Cardinal inveighed against persistent cor-
ruption in society, declaring that its eradication "must start from the 
top: our leaders, starting with the President and her cabinet must 
show themselves to be examples of integrity." Aquino apparently vis-
ited Sin to get the details of the basis of his charges, but in her defense 
could only reply that it was not easy to overturn quickly the "bad 
habits" acquired during her predecessor. 
Church leaders, clergy of all ranks, and the laity now are in a 
position similar to those commanders and their troops of the Philip-
pine Armed Forces, with Enrile and Ramos in the lead, who success-
fully seized power during February 22-25, 1986. A potentially 
dangerous precedent was set for both Church and Army during "the 
miracle at EDSA." However, should the Church and/or the Army 
feel that circumstances dictate a repeat of earlier political intervention, 
will they then necessarily find themselves on the same side? 
The prospect is troubling for at least two reasons. First, clerical 
involvement in Philippine political affairs in recent years has not nec-
essarily been peaceful. More than a dozen Philippine Roman Catholic 
clergy joined and have fought with the Communists' New People's 
Army. In September 1985, one priest who had joined the NPA, Fa-
ther Nilo Valerio, was killed, along with three fellow NPA insurgents 
in a shoot-out in Davao.79 Then, too, the accession of Mrs. Aquino has 
not necessarily changed the views of NPA clerics. The well-known 
Reverend Conrado Balweg, onetime NP A activist, after first indicat-
ing that he was ready to make his peace with the Aquino regime, now 
leads a new guerrilla resistance group, together with an ex-seminarian 
named Mailed Molina. 80 The group is made up of some of Balweg's 
NPA followers among the Luzon hill tribes and is called the "Cordil-
lera People's Liberation Army." There are claims that the group has 
broken with the NP A and now is dedicating itself, in militant fashion, 
to the problems of the hill tribe people of Northern Luzon, including 
79. Far East Broadcasting Company Report, Manila, September 5, 1985, p. P5. 
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their demands for greater autonomy. Meanwhile, Balweg has been 
holding "reconciliation" talks with the CPP leadership. In the au-
thor's opinion, admiration for this charismatic revolutionary among 
younger Filipino clergy today remains considerable. 
Second, Enrile, before and after his depature from the cabinet, as 
well as his Armed Forces associates, clearly have aligned themselves 
with those-including military and business elements-who are op-
posed either to any accommodation with the CPP, or to an abandon-
ment of the U.S. military bases. This group also is less than 
enthusiastic toward the more sweeping social reform legislation that 
continues to resonate favorably in various, particularly younger, cleri-
cal segments of the Philippine Catholic Church. In short, the dynamic 
of polarization at work in the present Philippine political scene is 
likely to force the Church's more enthusiastic Aquino supporters into 
confronting some agonizing future choices. 
The Military-About 500 to 600 members of the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP), among them five generals, joined Marcos' 
running mate, Arturo Tolentino, in his brief coup attempt a the Ma-
nila Hotel on July 6, 1986. Enrile, over strident opposition of fellow 
cabinet members-and after "staking his name, honor and office"-
saw to it that no formal disciplinary action was taken against the coup 
participantsY Although in July, 1986, and again in February, 1987 
all officers of the Philippine Armed Forces took a loyalty oath to the 
nations new constitutions, there are few Filipinos today who believe 
that the AFP now decisively has turned its back on future political 
ventures. 
Marcos' fall, after all, was a turning point in Philippine life, not 
least because it was the first time in the Republic's national history 
that a coup-like military initiative brought about a change of govern-
ment. This hardly was the start of the politicization of the AFP, how-
ever. For years, Marcos had used a tayo-tayo ("crony") system to 
place his favorites in key command positions. Indeed, among the rea-
sons subsequently given by General Ramos for joining Enrile against 
Marcos was that "cronyism" had become so rife in the AFP that it 
was seriously undermining the military's efficiency, particularly in 
confronting the Communist insurgency.82 In November 1985, Ramos 
publicly berated the AFP for laxity and unprofessional conduct, which 
he said was causing needless casualties in the fight against the Com-
81. The Manila Chronicle, July 9, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, July 10, 1986, p. P7. 
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munist guerrillas. 83 
Ramos was not alone in his criticisms: reform-minded "Young 
Turks" among the AFP's field and subaltern grade officers began to 
coalesce even before the 1984 Batasang election campaign as new op-
position groups reached out to them and to other interest groups. A 
"clean election drive campaign," called Kamalayan '86, which began 
among a few officers, joined other reform-minded officers committed 
to exerting quiet pressure for a variety of perceived needs, among them 
retirement of "overstaying" (i.e. overage) generals, improvement in lo-
gistical support services, particularly field communications in counter-
insurgency campaigns, promotions based on merit, and tighter 
discipline and training procedures. Initially shunning the limelight in 
order to preserve at least the appearance of the tradition of a "non-
politicized" AFP, most of the "Young Turk" officers during 1985-
1986 eventually affiliated with a loose coordinating body called RAM 
(generally taken to mean as standing for "Reform the Armed Forces 
Movement"). 
The advent of the Aquino era did not mean a dissolution of RAM 
or its ephemeral satellites. Nor did it discourage the emergence of 
other internal AFP "fraternal" cliques. On the contrary, as basic 
RAM differences with Aquino's policies emerged, they seemed to en-
courage further "Young Turk" activity. As Aquino attempted to seek 
a peaceful rapprochement with the Communists, pursuing talks with 
the CPP, and the possibility of a cease-fire and even of an amnesty for 
the NPA, the RAM publicly expressed doubts. In one press interview, 
a RAM spokesman sharply attacked NP A leaders, charging that, 
while the Communists talked about the desirability of a "power shar-
ing" arrangement with the Aquino government, NP A guerrillas re-
fused to lay down their arms and forego violence. RAM not only 
accused the NP A of being responsible for numerous new atrocities, 
but of trying to "gain strategic positioning in the rural areas." Mean-
while, other internal interest and support groups increasingly emerged 
within the AFP. Some reserve officers, united in a group calling itself 
"The Brothers," denied it embraced Marcos loyalists. Another inter-
est group, dating from the early 1970s, and called "El Diablo," re-
cently has reemerged under the name "The Guardians." The political 
leanings of these and other internal groups is not known. To an ex-
tent, they appear to be "mutual-protection" societies, intent on pro-
moting the careers of their respective members. However, one 
Philippine academic who has been studying their rise observed that 
83. The Straits Times, November 8, 1985, p. 9, col. 4. 
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the emergence of the military cliques betokens a sense of drift and loss 
of effective central leadership in the AFP. The result is a search for 
new "rallying figures." 84 
An ambitious Enrile seems ready to become such a rallying fig-
ure. RAM's relationship with Enrile on the basic policy question of 
seeking an accommodation with the CPP-NPA is particularly note-
worthy. At first, after Aquino came to power, Enrile had said that he 
expected RAM to disband because "what they are asking for is being 
implemented."85 But when RAM, though generally keeping a low 
profile, did not break up and, as indicated, publicly voiced concern 
over government policy, there were no indications that the Defense 
Minister had any intention to order its dissolution, or even that he was 
uncomfortable with a politico-military action group within his own 
command. Indeed, even more than RAM, Enrile, known to have op-
posed Aquino's granting amnesty to CPP founding chairman Jose N. 
Sison, also has been persistently critical of the attempt to reach a rap-
prochement with the Communists, warning frequently that they are 
continuing to spread their influence. At the very time that the Aquino 
government was beginning its initial peace discussions with CPP-NPA 
emissaries, Enrile was warning that the CPP "has successfully infil-
trated various national government offices" in an attempt to 
"destabilize" the Aquino administration. CPP strategy, Enrile said, 
was to bore from within, by placing its agents in such strategic indus-
tries as communications, energy, transportation and banking. 86 A 
month later, at the height of the Tolentino coup fiasco in the Manila 
Hotel, Enrile asserted that Tolentino's actions should not distract Fili-
pinos from the "more important problem of insurgency." Enrile em-
phasized that the Communists were taking advantage of the Aquino 
administration's reconciliation strategy and of the "atmosphere of lib-
eralism prevailing in the land. " 87 This was a theme that he was to 
reiterate in later months, and carry into his January 1987 campaign 
against the new Constitution. 
The resignation of Enrile in the Cabinet change of November 23, 
1986 and the concurrent reputed failure of a coup plot by pro-Enrile 
officers in RAM and in the Defense Ministry's security force did not 
end the problems of the politicization process in the Armed Forces. 
84. Business Day (Manila), June 30, 1986, p. 20, col. 1. On the military cliques, see 
especially Business Day, July 29, 1986, p. 5, in FBIS, August 7, 1986, p. P7. 
85. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, March 10, 1986, in FBIS, March 11, 
1986, p. P15. 
86. Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 6, 1986, p. 1, col. 3. 
87. The Manila Chronicle, July 9, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, July 10, 1986, p. P7. 
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To be sure, the effective intervention of Ramos, and Enrile's replace-
ment by Lt. Gen. Rafael Ileto, reaffirmed the principle of non-political 
professionalism in the Armed Forces position. But RAM's stalwarts 
and Enrile's supporters in the officers corps-though some have been 
reassigned and "neutralized" in new staff positions-hardly are a 
spent force. On December 16, 1986, metropolitan Manila's daily Busi-
ness Day reported concern within the army over a reportedly clandes-
tine intelligence group in the military, called the "Cory Information 
Network" (CIN). Reportedly, CIN is to be the intelligence arm, gath-
ering information inside the armed forces, for a clandestine "Yellow 
Army." The latter is a 3,000-man, pro-Aquino protective force being 
developed under the guidance of Israeli instructors. Such develop-
ments, if true, do not suggest a stable, non-political armed forces es-
tablishment. The question of just what national political format the 
Armed Forces are to be fitted into remains, as does the dissatisfaction 
within the officers' corps with Aquino's persistence in seeking a rap-
prochement with the Communists. 
The latter, inevitably, is a political issue. And, as recent analyses 
again have emphasized, preservation of domestic security-including 
the waging of effective counter insurgency-historically has been a 
major, perhaps principal, preoccupation of the Philippine military es-
tablishment. 88 Even the most professional and least politicized ele-
ments of the officers corps are alarmed over whether, in the absence of 
aequate equipment, training and morale, the Philippine military estab-
lishment can discharge its major domestic security obligation. Indeed, 
in early October 1986, one senior Defense Ministry official, openly ex-
pecting the collapse of peace discussions with the Communists, 
warned that, given the poor state of their equipment and morale, the 
Philippine Armed Forces would be incapable of winning the war 
against the insurgents. 89 
Hard on the heels of Enrile's departure from the cabinet, Aquino 
on December 2, 1986, signed a number of Executive Orders, restoring 
tax-free privileges to the members of Armed Froces at commissaries 
and other benefits, and providing a greater role for reserve officers in 
military selection boards. More than these gestures will be needed, 
however, to reconcile the restive RAM and other dissident officers 
with the Aquino regime. In early January 1987, as Aquino began 
campaigning for popular ratification of the new Constitution, Enrile 
took to the political hustings against her-and against the new Char-
88. Ibid., November 23, 1986, p. 7, in FBIS, December 5, 1986, p. PS. 
89. The Manila Times, October 3, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, October 6, 1986, p. P7. 
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ter-railing against the "new dictatorship" that he claimed now had 
emerged in the wake of the revolution against Marcos. In this cam-
paign, Enrile made his debut as an independent political alternative to 
Aquino--and to the notion of compromise with the NPA or NDF. A 
memorandum, submitted by Ramos on behalf of senior military com-
manders to Aquino on November 15, 1986, and containing recommen-
dations on prosecuting the struggle against the Communists more 
effectively, bears the stamp of Enrile's political perception. If nothing 
else, the January 1987 campaign contesting Aquino's endorsement of 
the new Constitution makes this memorandum virtually a basis for the 
emerging Right's policy posture in subsequent months. In the 
meantime, the hard statistics of the Philippine Communist insurgency 
underscored that posture. Between February 24 and September 24, 
1986, according to Philippine Armed Forces sources, "at least" 1,918 
persons, including 513 civilians were killed. The remainder of the 
dead were primarily Philippine military and NPA insurgents.90 
Earlier, Enrile had warned of new Communist infiltration in the 
trade unions. As Defense Minister he also had attempted to protect 
the military from serious charges of human rights violations now being 
investigated by the Aquino government-appointed Commission on 
Human Rights. He also was critical of the dismissal of hundreds of 
pro-Marcos local government officials and their replacement by pro-
Aquino "Officers in Charge." While her press supporters berated all 
such Enrile "defiance," and within days of her accession to the presi-
dency urged Aquino to give her Defense Minister "another job,"91 En-
rile himself missed few opportunities to wide his own constitutency. 
For example, in the face of the Reverend Conrado Balweg's new lead-
ership role among the Luzon hill tribes, Enrile announced his own 
support for an "autonomous" government among the rebellious tribes 
of the Cordillera mountains. 92 
Another conflict between Aquino's and Enrile's perceptions and 
policies also emerged quickly over the future of the U.S. military bases 
and installations in the Philippines. Aquino has said that she will not 
disturb the present U.S.-Filipino lease agreement and would keep her 
"options open" until its 1991 expiration. The new Constitution pro-
vides, if necessary, for a plebiscite referendum on the matter. But 
powerful voices were heard in the deliberations of the "Concom" and 
elsewhere to make such foreign bases in the Philippines unconstitu-
90. Business Day, October I, 1986, p. 16, in FBIS, October 2, 1986, p. P5. 
91. Ang Pahayagang Malaya, March 19, 1986, p. 4, in FBIS, March 28, 1986, p. Pl7. 
92. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, May 13, 1986, in FBIS, May 13, 1986, p. 
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tiona!. As a result, Aquino herself seemed to lean toward shutting 
down all U.S. military facilities in her country. Though she frequently 
reiterated that she would not foreclose her choices ("Because, who am 
I to say what will happen in the next year, or two years, or three 
years?"), she also declared in a July 1986 interview that she did not 
believe the Philippines would face an external threat if the U.S. bases 
were removed from Philippine soil.93 Among her supporters, espe-
cially on the Left, and in Manila's volatile student and professional 
circles, the U.S. bases and Phlippine dependence on the United States 
generally long has been anathema. 
Enrile also made his views clear. On March 30, 1986, he report-
edly told visiting Japanese parliamentarians that he favored retention 
of U.S. bases in the Philippines beyond 1991.94 And by mid-June he 
reiterated that "no matter how unpleasant the reality may be, whether 
we like it or not, these military bases in the Philippines will be with us 
far beyond this administration. " 95 
Perhaps Aquino felt that, by being noncommittal on the future of 
the bases and leaving the issue to national legislative decision or, if 
necessary, to a plebiscite under the new Constitution, a polarization on 
the issue can be avoided. Yet, precisely because of Enrile's unequivo-
cal stand, the matter was quickly polarized, and Mrs. Aquino's own 
policy has been pleasing neither to the advocates nor the opponents of 
a future U.S. military presence. Certainly, key senior military com-
manders, in testimony before the "Concom" hearings and elsewhere, 
have made it plain that they are against any provision barring foreign 
bases from Philippine soil. 96 
This is not to say that Enrile had all of the AFP behind him on all 
issues. For example, Aquino had her own group of backers in the 
officers corps, led from the beginning by Enrile's eventual successor, 
General Rafael Ileto, a former Assistant AFP staff chief and Enrile's 
Deputy Defense Minister. This position made it possible to watch En-
rile closely. Also, by swiftly retiring some 20 allegedly "overstaying" 
generals, whose terms had been extended by Marcos, Aquino found 
favor among younger officers. On the other hand, a third AFP fac-
tion-that of the now quietly covert, but still pro-Marcos loyalists-
increasingly cast its lot with Enrile. It was significant that during his 
93. In an interview with Clayton Jones, The Christian Science Monitor, July 25, 1986, 
p. !,col. I. 
94. Kyodo despatch, Manila, March 31, 1986, in FBIS, March 31, 1986, p. P9. 
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brief July 6-8 1986 coup attempt, Arturo Tolentino, after having pro-
claimed himself Acting President, appointed Enrile to his cabinet as 
Defense Minister-an appointment the latter quickly declined. 
Enrile's protection against any retribution against the pro-Marcos 
military who had sided with Tolentino placed these military elements 
under an "obligation of honor" to Enrile, as one dissident general put 
it. It certainly further strengthened the perception among many of the 
regular pro-Marcos demonstrators and activists in Manila with whom 
this author talked in July 1986 and subsequent months that Enrile 
essentially was on their side. It also fed speculation that Enrile knew 
days in advance of the planned Tolentino coup but did nothing to stop 
it, or even warn Aquino. What became abundantly apparent from En-
rile's various statements and policies since his unexpected February 
22, 1986 rebellion against Marcos is that the Defense Minister was 
trying to develop a broad consensus of popular support, to allow him 
eventually to float upward in fulfillment of his often discussed Presi-
dential ambitions. Though he has rejected thus far formal party affili-
ation, he began building his own organizational political base through 
the revival of the old Nacionalista party, now led by some of his allies 
in the business and professional communities. 97 It is well to stress that 
his ties with those communities are close. The 62-year-old Harvard 
Law-educated Enrile began his career as a tax specialist and corporate 
lawyer, later becoming Insurance and Customs Commissioner and 
Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, before entering the Na-
tional Defense Ministry in 1970. 
On the other hand, though it may be the chief source of strenth 
for his present political standing, the AFP also is the reef upon which 
Enrile's prestige and aspirations may run aground. The Philippines' 
total regular military force in its Southeast Asian environment is con-
sidered comparatively small in size (about 113,000); Malaysia, with a 
population less than a third that of the Philippines, has a regular mili-
tary force almost as large (110,000), while Thailand, with a population 
less than that of the Philippines, maintains a much larger force (more 
than 256,000).98 Planned infusions of U.S. military assistance (e.g. 
over $100 million for Fiscal Year 1986 alone) do not begin to address 
the AFP's grave problems of logistical modernization and need for 
improved counterinsurgency tactics. Already in mid-1985, as the 
NPA was striking ever more widely, boldly, and with company-sized 
97. Asiaweek (Hongkong), July 13, 1986, p. 13. 
98. The Military Balance 1986-1987 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London, 1986), pp. 162, 166, and 170. 
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combat units against the AFP and "home defense" auxiliaries, Enrile 
had warned that "it would take 10 years and billions of Pesos to stop 
the Communist rebellion."99 
Having committed itself so unequivocally to the Aquino Presi-
dency, the Reagan Administration undoubtedly viewed Enrile as an 
embarrassment. On November 1, 1986, the U.S. press reported that 
the U.S. Justice Department was "investigating" whether Enrile and 
his wife illegally had diverted funds to acquire real estate holdings in 
San Francisco. 100 The report was widely disseminated. To the au-
thor's knowledge, no mention was made in the U.S. media of the state-
ment made shortly afterwards by a member of Aquino's special Good 
Government Commission, charged with investigating ill-gotten wealth 
by Philippine government officials, that the Commission had no evi-
dence of any unlawful diversion of funds by Enrile. 101 
IV. THE COMMUNISTS AND THE PRIVATE ARMIES 
The Communists-There are two Communist Parties in the Phil-
ippines. The oldest, smallest (about 1500 formal members) and least 
influential is the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), formally es-
tablished on November 7, 1930. 102 Originally outlawed by Republic 
Act 1700 in 1957 toward the end of the post-World War II guerrilla 
insurgency in the Philippines, the PKP struck a "national unity" 
agreement with Marcos, in October 1974, which, together with his 
Presidential Decision (PD) 885 two years later, conferred a quasi-legal 
status on the party so long as it desisted from violence or submission 
to foreign "subversive" influence. After Aquino acceded to the Philip-
pine Presidency, the PKP declared that "we did not vote for you" 
because it considered Aquino to have been little different from the "In-
ternational Monetary Fund-dictated program" of Marcos. 103 Though 
it did not urge a boycott of the February 7, 1986 Presidential election, 
the PKP made it clear that it regarded the poll as meaningless. But 
PKP Secretary General Felicisimo Macapagal, in an open letter to 
Aquino, also insisted that he PKP considers itself "a legal organiza-
tion," and, as such, entitled to conduct its activities freely like all other 
99. The Straits Times, June 22, 1985, p. 8, col. 8. 
100. The San Jose Mercury News, November 1, 1986, p. 1; The New York Times, No-
vember 2, 1986, p. 5. 
101. Kyodo despatch, Manila, November 4, 1986, in FBIS, November 4, 1986, p. P4. 
102. On the development and objectives of Philippine Communism, see Justus M. van 
der Kroef, Communism in Southeast Asia (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980). 
103. As published in the Morning Star (London), May 9, 1986, p. 4, col. I. 
PHILIPPINE TANGLE AND THE U.S. 41 
political parties. 104 
The PKP pronouncements that periodically appear in the pages 
of the Prague-based World Marxist Review are important primarily as 
a potential conduit of Soviet bloc influence in the Philippines. They 
are of little or no account in Aquino's policy perceptions. Moreover, 
they probably have little or no impact on the Philippines generally, 
unless another Philippine government seeks to commit itself to a more 
"neutralist" or Moscow-oriented accommodationist policy. 
Far more influential and menacing to Aquino and her successors 
is the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its loose alliance 
of labor, student, farmers and other front and collateral interest 
groups called the National Democratic Front (NDF), and, more par-
ticularly, its guerrilla force, the New People's Army (NPA). Founded 
on December 26, 1968 on Mao Zedong's seventy-fifth birthday, the 
CPP's original Constitution stressed the importance of Maoist 
thought. Indeed, that Constitution indicated (article 1, section 1) that, 
for purposes of concise identification, the CPP would either append 
"Marxist-Leninist" (ML) to its name, or add the words "Mao Tse-
tung's thought" parenthetically. 105 Since the second half of the 1970s, 
however, and the turbulence following Mao's death and "the Gang of 
Four" in China itself, the CPP has carried on a kind of "de-Maoiza-
tion" of its own by emphasizing its national Philippine character in its 
history, tactics and objectives. 
Popular estimates put the NP A's strength as high as 20,000 mem-
bers. More authoritative estimates settle at about 16,000, adding that 
about a third of the country's 41,400 barangays (the country's lowest 
units of government) are reported to have a CPP political organization 
of some sort and that 12 percent of the barangays are considered to be 
under CPP control. 106 The CPP-NPA operates in every one of the 
country's 73 provinces and its power has been especially evident 
among the rural populations on the island of Samar, Negros, Cat-
anduanes and parts of Mindanao (including the city of Davao). 
Voicing alarm over the advent of CPP-NPA power has been de 
rigueur in recent years. On October 30, 1985, U.S. Assistant Secretary 
104. Veritas (Manila), June 9-11, 1986, p. 22, col. 2. 
105. For the original CPP Constitution, see The Maoist Communist Party of the Philip-
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of Defense Richard Armitage warned the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that the NPA could achieve a "strategic stalemate" with 
the AFP "within three to five years"-a time period estimate that the 
NPA said it had made early in 1985, but which by February 1986, the 
NP A believed had been shortened in view of the expected turmoil sur-
rounding and following the Presidential elections. 107 As was indicated 
earlier, the perception among U.S. observers in 1985 appeared to grow 
that, because of Marcos' political repression and corruption, the grow-
ing poverty among a burgeoning population, and the intimidating bru-
tality and violence of NP A tactics against local government officials 
and military (a brutality which some observers likened to the infamous 
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia), the Communists were steadily becoming 
a greater danger. 108 
The rise of Aquino-though it precipitated a crisis in CPP tactics 
and leadership-did not mean any reduction in the level of NP A vio-
lence. Though statistical evidence is not altogether certain, there was 
an "increase in rebel activities after the February revolution" (i.e. 
Marcos' fall). 109 There also were disturbing reports, based on inter-
views with CPP and NP A leaders, that Communist insurgent units in 
various parts of the country planned to continue their armed "pro-
tracted struggle" against the government. 110 In any case, party leaders 
and cadres appeared unconvinced that they could gain any advantage 
from the December 10, 1986 truce and subsequent peace negotiations 
with the Aquino government. The principal benefit to the CPP of the 
Aquino peace overtures was purely tactical: the lull in fighting and 
restraints imposed on Army counterinsurgency activity (the NPA 
bands have felt little restraint) afforded the Communists a "demo-
cratic space," in their leaders' parlance, during which party power can 
be consolidated in the barangays. Mounting numbers of allegations 
both by the Army and the NP A that the truce has been violated by the 
other side are being examined by a previously mentioned National 
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Cease Fire Committee (NCC). The NCC's periodic findings-includ-
ing dismissal of some Army charges that the NP A violated the truce-
have heightened the antagonisms and controversy over the whole issue 
of a peace negotiation process between the government and the 
insurgents. 
Nevertheless, some party leaders express their determination to 
hold peace talks with Aquino's representatives. Others early voiced 
skepticism that such discussions would bear any fruit. 111 Almost daily 
the Philippine press reports on NP A ambushes or other clashes with 
the AFP, or carries news items on "executions" carried out by Com-
munist death squads, such as the following: 
Communist led People's Army (NPA) liquidation units have 
executed a total of 17 persons with 'blood debts' to the peo-
ple in the metropolitan Cebu area and Cebu's hinterlands 
this year, according to the latest issue of 'Pakigbisog' (Strug-
gle), a Cebu based underground Communist newspaper. 
The paper also reported that from last year to March this 
year more than 45 counter-revolutionaries and other bad ele-
ments were meted death penalties by the NP A. 112 
Meanwhile, there are other reports that NPA leaders in Panay 
"are already raring to launch a propaganda campaign against the ris-
ing 'US-Cory' dictatorship," and that an NPA spokesman in Bataan 
describes the Aquino government "as shaky" and likely to "crumble 
any time," or that the AFP Regional Commander in the Bicol region 
has disclosed documents indicating that the NP A insurgents in that 
area are planning attacks on government officials and the military in 
order to "stalemate" any planned CPP-Government peace talks. 113 In 
the author's calculations, from Aquino's accession to power on Febru-
ary 25, 1986 to the middle of December 1986, at least 1000 Philippine 
military and civilians died in clashes with NP A units, or at the hands 
of NPA execution (so-called "Sparrow") squads. Indeed, since 
Aquino, some NP A attacks have been noteworthy for their size and 
careful tactical preparation. This was the case in the spectacular NP A 
ambush of an AFP unit on April 18, 1986 on Oas, Albay province, in 
which more than 100 NPA guerrillas participated and 22 Philippine 
military were killed. 
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What characterized the actual, "in the field" posture of the NP A 
during the shaky truce period that started on December 10, 1986, was 
the retention and even the flaunting of the weapons held by the insur-
gents-as if to impress on the population that the guerrillas were in-
vulnerable. Clearly what the NPA and party have been seeking is 
recognition as a de facto countergovernment, that must somehow be 
accommodated in any peace settlement with the Aquino regime. Al-
ready in June 1986, the NPA insisted that the Philippine Armed 
Forces withdraw from "our territories." 114 What the party has been 
asking is tantamount to the surrender of the Philippine countryside to 
the NPA, and the reference to "our territories," suggests an NPA con-
cept of a Communist "liberated zone" and an existing state within a 
state. Indeed, in its initial, December 23, 1986 proposal for an agenda 
of peace talks with the government, the NDF sought a "transitional 
coalition government" for the Philippines in which the Communists 
would be represented along with other parties. The coalition concept 
has been sharply rejected by Aquino, but, clearly, the CPP intends to 
persist. Meanwhile, the party and the NP A intend to remain a fight-
ing force. The NPA, CPP founding chairman Jose M. Sison, declared 
as early as mid-April 1986, that he "will never surrender" to the 
Aquino government, because the NP A has made so many sacrifices 
that "they will not give up their arms." 115 
The United States, prudently allowing for peace talks with the 
CPP to reach some sort of conclusion, thus far has been reluctant to 
comment on the obvious persistence of the Comunist threat-a threat 
which, as we have seen, only a few months earlier had prompted offi-
cial American expressions of alarm. Indeed, when U.S. Secretary of 
State George Shultz visited Manila in June 1986, he was told in report-
edly "blunt" terms by Enrile and Armed Forces Chief Ramos that 
they had "no illusions" that government offers of peace talks would 
end the Communist rebellion: "it is a possibility only if we are talking 
about a miracle," Enrile told Shultz. However, the peace talk offer, 
Filipino leaders felt, perhaps could bring a few of the less-avowed 
Marxist insurgents "down from the hills," and, in any case, would be 
considered a gesture of reconciliation. According to these Filipino 
leaders, such a gesture had to be extended to the CPP in order to show 
that the government had gone "the extra mile," and that the Commu-
nists would be responsible for any continuing bloodshed. 116 
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The U.S. rection to all this was a curious one. Various govern-
ment reconciliation programs during the Marcos years also periodi-
cally had brought insurgents "down from the hills." But, 
nevertheless, the level of fighting not only increased in the same pe-
riod, but during the early 1980s, the CPP generally had come to be 
perceived as more of a threat, as vide, earlier noted US expressions of 
alarm. Yet, on being told during his June 1986 discussions in Manila 
that new peace talks would not slacken the Communist resistance, 
Shultz nevertheless felt able at that time to come out with his well-
known remark that "I am bullish about the Philippines." The basis 
for this newly optimistic assessment clearly, then, was not that the 
violent Communist resistance was going to end. Rather, the optimism 
seems to have been based on what Shultz, after his June 1986 Manila 
discussions, declared to be enhanced Philippine understanding of "the 
need for political change" and for an "opening" to "democracy," as 
well as an improved economic development. Shultz even drew paral-
lels between Aquino's policies with the reforms instituted by the Du-
arte regime in El Salvador. 117 
The Secretary seemed off the mark. The Salvadoran case demon-
strates, if anything, that even with "political change" and enhanced 
"democracy" the Communist threat continues to loom large, certainly 
in that Central American country. And where in Southeast Asia in 
the immediate decade after World War II was there a greater opportu-
nity for "political change" and for an "opening" to "democracy" than 
in the Philippines? Yet, the Communist Huk insurgency rose to its 
greatest danger in those very years. How swiftly, today, economic de-
velopment anticipated under Aquino will provide new stability for the 
Philippines is anyone's guess. But as for "political change" since 
Aquino, it, as we have seen, has been a source of considerable uncer-
tainty and division within the new Filipino government. And it is pre-
cisely that persistent Communist issue that is polarizing perceptions of 
needed "political change" and of the kind of leadership that the coun-
try requires. Having decried the inadequacies of the Marcos regime, 
and in various ways having assisted in Mr. Marcos' departure, the 
Reagan Administration understandably wishes to put as positive a pat-
ina on the regime of Marcos' successor. One can only hope, however, 
that Shultz' remark "I am bullish about the Philippines" will not come 
to haunt the United States as did the praise voiced by U.S. Vice Presi-
dent George Bush while attending the inauguration of the then newly-
reelected President Marcos in Manila in June 1981: "We love your 
117. Ibid. 
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adherence to democratic processes." 118 
Fortunately for Shultz and the United States-and as was the 
case with the Communist Huk problem in the 1950s-Philippine 
Communism is likely less to be vitiated by dubious "political change," 
or programs of economic development, and more by many persistent 
structual and leadership problems within the CPP-NPA. The scat-
tered, wholly archipelagic character of the Philippines, the difficulties 
of terrain and communication, the resulting problems of establishing 
closer tactical coordination and consistent ideological training and dis-
cipline among the often widely dispersed NP A units and CPP cells 
long have been major and insurmountable obstacles to forging the 
CPP ina an effective organizational weapon. 
Divided into six "territorial commissions" (Northern Luzon, 
Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, the Visayas, Mindanao and Metro-
politan Manila), each with their own party command structure, and 
supervised by four "national commissions" (military affairs, propa-
ganda, united front building, and mass movement organizations), as 
well as by a Politburo and Central Committee, the CPP is top-heavy 
with localized and often jealous leaders. Hence, coordination among 
the party's three chief tactical concerns-rural insurgency, agitation, 
and united front building in the cities-has suffered. 119 
An even more serious liability is an environment of opportunistic 
appeal to join various armed bands ranging from ill-disciplined 
paramilitary "home defense" forces and so-called "private armies" of 
warlord-like rural business typcoons, landowners or political bosses, to 
"liberation" fronts of Muslim secessionists seeking an independent 
state in Mindanao, and anti-Communist Christian charismatic armed 
cults. These bands readily draw on the abundant human jetsam of a 
permanently floating underclass, rife with unemployment, banditry 
and racketeering, in one of Asia's poorest nations. Much of the Com-
munist guerrilla force consists of such elements, who easily drift from 
one gang to another, dependent on available opportunity, lending little 
credibility to a picture of a well-organized Communist threat. It has 
been reliably estimated that, of the often reported 18,000- to 20,000-
man NP A force, "the true figure of trained gun-carrying fighters" may 
be no more than 2,000. 120 This number is large enough to wreak some 
havoc, to be sure. Moreover, the importance of the improverishment 
and discontent in much of the Philippine countryside, or of the CPP's 
118. Asia 1982 Yearbook (Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, 1982), p. 225. 
119. On CPP organization see, e.g., Manila Bulletin, December 5, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, 
December 8, 1986, p. P7. 
120. The Economist (London), April 26, 1986, p. 44. 
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attempts at ideological indoctrination of exploited tenants and estate 
workers in village "night classes" and "people's courses" should not 
be underestimated. Even so, it does appear that the CPP-NPA still is 
a long way off from being able to overthrow any Filipino government, 
because of the lack of total force and/or tactical training and ineffi-
ciency of its numbers. 
To these organizational weaknesses of the CPP now must also be 
added a serious rift in the highest leadership circles of the party, which 
erupted in the aftermath of Aquino's accession to the Presidency. Af-
ter 1977 and the capture by Marcos government forces of CPP found-
ing chairman Jose Sison and some of his chief lieutenants, party 
control fell mainly into the hands of Rodolfo Salas (alias "Kumander 
Bilog"). Salas' tactics of organizational decentralization, coupled with 
a sharp intensification of local guerrilla violence and brutal executions 
of "anti-people" (i.e. Philippine officials and military), had several ef-
fects. It opened paths to prominence for local cadres, and at the same 
time it imparted an aura of stepped-up, uncompromising and unrelent-
ing CPP-NPA activity, deeply intimidating local village populations. 
Finally, it impressed some foreign observers, who were little inclined 
to scrutinize the organizational weaknesses of the NP A, with the 
seemingly new power of Philippine Communism. 
The CPP's violent new hard-line also set the stage for a leadership 
rift, however. It was Salas' position to boycott the February 7 Presi-
dential election, which the party, under his direction, called "a sham" 
and a "meaningless but noisy electoral contest between local reaction-
aries."121 However, the surprising outpouring of sympathy for 
Aquino, backed by the Church, and followed by the successful Enrile-
Ramos coup and the "miracle at EDSA," all left other party leaders 
feeling that a major and potentially revolutionary dynamic in Philip-
pine politics had passed the party by. During April and May 1986 
CPP Politburo and Central Committee meetings, it came to a crisis. 
Party publications criticized the elections boycott and Salas stepped 
down as party chairman (he remains in the Central Committee). A 
temporary party chairman, Benito Tiamzon (variously known as "Ku-
mander Victoriano" or "Ka"-short for Kasama or Comrade-
"Percy"), took over. 122 
At about the same time, a senior party theoretician, Saturnino 
Ocampo, former business editor of the Manila Times, and Antonio 
121. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, January 6, 1986, in FBIS, January 6, 
1986, p. PIS. 
122. The Sunday Times (Manila), June 8, 1986, p. I, col. 3; Ang Pahayagang Malaya 
(Manila), June 7, 1986, p. I, col. 4. 
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Zumel, the principal leader of the National Democratic Front (NDF), 
the party's earlier named complex of labor, youth, women's and other 
front groups, were authorized to enter into peace talks with Aquino. 
Ocampo and Zumel appear to be the leaders of a more moderate fac-
tion that has questioned the uncompromising hardline tactics of intim-
idation associated with Salas. The Tiamzon appointment is 
temporary, however, until the Central Committee can review it, pre-
sumably in light of any progress the party may have made in winning 
concessions from the Aquino regime and in gaining influence in vari-
ous institutions and social strata during the liberalized post-Marcos 
political atmosphere. Meanwhile, Sison, released on March 5, 1986 
from detenition over the strenouous objections of Enrile and senior 
military officials, has been lecturing intensively and rebuilding his own 
base on the Left, including promoting new political organizations like 
the Partido ng Bayan and the "New Democratic Party". 
It is necessary to stress that the Salas-Ocampo factional split has 
been costly to the CPP. Toward the end of May 1986, it was reported 
that some 200 NP A guerrillas had been executed by their fellow rebels 
in the preceding three months alone-an estimate that may well have 
turned out to be too low. On occasion, NPA executions are said to 
have involved "zombies," i.e. alleged "traitors" or government infiltra-
tors. 123 In early October 1986, the Army's regional command in 
Northern Mindanao reported that the NPA had executed 600 of its 
own men in a bloody purge in that region since the early months of the 
year. Compounding the confusion are reports that Marcos loyalists 
are funding some local NP A cadres to "destabilize" the Aquino gov-
ernment. 124 The CPP factionalism and infighting also have produced 
uncertainty in party policy. Supposed CPP demands that Commu-
nists be included in a new coalition government, or in some of the 
government commissions and boards, has deepened suspicion in many 
quarters. 125 When Jose Sison declared that the NPA would not agree 
to a cease-fire until specified "land reform" had been carried out in the 
country, other CPP leaders, reportedly including the new dominant 
Tiamzon group, declared that Sison was not authorized to speak for 
the party. 126 During the negotations between the government and the 
Communists following the December 10, 1986 truce, party spokesmen 
123. The Economist (London), Mary 24, 1986, p. 36; PNA despatch, Manila, May 13, 
1986, in FBIS, May 13, 1986, p. Pl6. 
124. The News Herald (Manila), May 7, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, May 8, 1986, p. P7. 
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reiterated the need for land reform and an end to U.S. bases in the 
country. Meanwhile , the NPA's "general staff" accused Armed 
Forces Chief Fidel Ramos of sabotaging Aquino's peace efforts by or-
dering a nationwide AFP offensive against the Communist 
insurgents. 127 
Aquino herself has been charged by various CPP quarters of fol-
lowing an uncertain policy. The President recently was reminded that 
on December 26, 1984, along with leaders of other groups then in op-
position to Marcos, she had signed an agreement pledging legalization 
of the CPP, a redress of all legitimate grievances of those who had 
resorted to rebellion and an amnesty and release of political detainees. 
But, since the January 1986 Presidential campaign, Aquino has been 
downplaying any legalization of the CPP, emphasizing instead the 
cease-fire and peace talk process, and warning further that Communist 
violence will be met with retribution. 128 
The perception that Mrs. Aquino, by virtue of her family back-
ground and social status, belongs to the same set of traditional Filipino 
oligarchies that dominated the era of Marcos and his predecessors, led 
some party leaders openly to doubt her ability to change public policy. 
The Philippines still were viewed as gripped by "feudalism," "fascism" 
and "US imperialism." 129 Other CPP-NPA elements, like those in the 
Ocampo-Zumel faction, see advantages in the liberalized Aquino era 
for the party, particularly the opportunity to expand the party's reach 
among different interest groups. Certainly, the party's NDF front 
complex and its labor union ally the Kilusang Mayo Uno have been 
able to be more active in proselytizing than in the Marcos era. This, 
however, also puts the CPP "moderates," as well as Aquino, in a 
quandary, as the hardline anti-Communist group around Enrile and in 
the military warn against classical Communist "talking while fighting" 
tactics, and stress alleged Communist infiltration in key industries and 
various national government offices. 
On October 30, 1986, a CPP statement formally rejected the new 
Aquino-supported Constitution for the Philippines. The party de-
scribed the new charter as "pro-imperialist and anti-masses," and 
charged that the references in the Constitution to human rights and 
social justice were mere "bourgeois-democratic" embellishments. The 
party's Regional Commissions quickly followed suit in the following 
127. The Straits Times, May 16, 1986, p. 7, col. 7. 
128. Cf. Jose M. Sison, "Pitfalls of a Legal CPP," Ang Pahayagang Malaya, June 7, 
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months. For example, the Central Luzon party organization, in early 
December 1986, characterized the Constitution as designed to "legiti-
mize the U.S. imperalist control" over the country. Meanwhile, lead-
ing pro-CPP organizations like the KMU and the People's Party 
(Partido ng Bayan) attacked the Aquino cabinet's "pro-American 
bias" following its November 23, 1986 reshuffle. 130 Under these con-
ditions, to continue to sit down with Aquino's representatives in order 
to achieve a truce and a political settlement of differences seemed 
merely a tactic, while the party positioned itself for inevitable intensifi-
cation of armed struggle. 
The "Private Armies"-At the close of April 1986, Philippine 
Constabulary intelligence sources estimated that there were "131 pri-
vate armies still operating nationwide" in the Philippines. 131 Though 
some of the leaders of these "armies" were said to have fled the coun-
try, or had been "neutralized" by security forces, the same sources 
declared that most of the "armies" were still "intact and well armed," 
and that they had possession of an estimated 8, 700 firearms. To the 
author, the latter is a very conservative, and probably low figure. The 
total number of those involved in these "private armies" and other 
armed gangs-some of a more criminal and transient variety-is hard 
to gauge. Many of their members are involved only on a "part-time" 
or intermittent basis. In the author's estimation, not less than 130,000 
persons in the aggregate are involved. 
Elsewhere, the types of these armed groups and the socio-eco-
nomic circumstances that gave rise to them have been explored in 
greater detail. 132 These groups deserve notice here because collec-
tively they-like the Church, the Armed Forces and the Commu-
nists-constitute an important and largely unpredictable element in 
power in contemporary Filipino politics and government. The new 
February 1987 Phlippine Constitution provides that all private armies 
"not recognized by duly constituted authority" should be "disman-
tled." The "Civilian Home Defense Force" (CHDF) would also be 
subject to disbanding if found not to be "consistent" with the concept 
of a "citizen armed force" provided for elsewhere in the Constitution. 
In the present Philippine political economy, it seems likely, however, 
that a number of private armies will find recognition "by duly consti-
130. Ang Pahayagang Malaya, December 5, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, December 9, 1986, p. 
Pl1. 
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tuted authority." Even if they are not "duly constituted," they or 
others like them will continue to exist. 
The 70,000-man "Civilian Home Defense Force" (CHDF) origi-
nally was organized in 1974 as a para-military organization under the 
Philippine Constabulary in order to assist in anti-Communist and 
other security operations in the rural areas. Over the years, however, 
CHDF units, like a number of special, poorly supervised, AFP "task 
forces," assumed an increasingly independent operational character. 
They often became indistinguishable from mere dacoity, extorting and 
terrorizing local village populations and abusing human rights. In ad-
dition, some local CHDF units, wearing special uniforms and never 
seeming to want for weapons and other equipment, in effect became 
"private armies" of wealthy, powerful estate owners and local political 
leaders, many of whom were close Marcos supporters. Probably no 
one, not even the top AFP staff, knows exactly how many CHDF per-
sonnel there are. At the close of July 1986, AFP chief Fidel Ramos 
estimated that only 53,000 CHDF members were considered full-time, 
"duly appointed," and entitled to allowances; 17,000 other CHDF 
presumably were part-timers. Ramos has urged a reduction of the 
CHDF to 45,000 full-time regulars, while opposing any dissolution of 
the force for fear it would "surely weaken the territorial defense sys-
tem." Members of Aquino's cabinet on the other hand, including one 
time Local Government Minister Aquilino Pimentel Jr., repeatedly 
have urged Aquino to disarm and disband the CHDF altogether and 
return police authority to responsible local officials. 133 (Plans for this 
are said to be ready for implementation after the Constitutional ratifi-
cation plebiscite in February, 1987). 
Even, if the CHDF formally were to be declared dissolved, or 
even reformed, at some time in the future, most of its units would 
probably remain so much a part of local security and political elite 
power structures that the basic function of these CHDF units would 
surface again in some other organizational form. Not surprisingly, the 
CPP-NPA over and over has demanded the dissolution of the CHDF 
and the "dismantling of private armies" generally as priority items in 
peace discussions or discussion of a cease-fire with the Aquino govern-
ment. 134 Virtually without exception, however, Philippine Constabu-
lary and Army commanders with whom this writer discussed the 
133. !did. On the use of CHDF units by landlords on Negros, for example, see also We 
Forum (Quezon City), October 22-28, 1985, p. 7, col. I. On Ramos' estimates, see Business 
Day (Manila), July 29, 1986, p. II, in FBIS, August I, 1986, p. P6. 
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CHDF in the past year recognize the organization's grave problems of 
discipline and operational control; yet none would be pleased to see 
the CHDF dissolved completely. 
In the murky, lawless atmosphere in which the CHDF, various 
military "task forces" and other "private armies," or furtive armed 
religious cult groups operate, the line between one organization or 
cause often becomes difficult to distinguish from another, or from the 
pillage and violence committed by ordinary criminal gangs. One illus-
tration will suffice. In mid-1986, scores of inhabitants of the village of 
Puso, near Bacolod City, on the island of Negros, in a petition to presi-
dent Aquino said that the safety and security in their area had gravely 
deteriorated. The petitioners declared that the Army's Eleventh In-
fantry Batallion stationed in their area first had formed an auxiliary 
counterinsurgency group under the name KADRE (Kalayaan, 
Demokrasya Ug Reporma-"Freedom, Democracy and Reforms"), 
some of whose members had been NP A rebels who ostensibly had sur-
rendered. It was charged, however, that KADRE members, appar-
ently with Eleventh Batallion connivance, began masquerading as 
NPA rebels, thereby exploiting the local population with greater im-
punity. However, another local NPA band also surrendered to the 
Batallion, creating a new rival counterinsurgency group also engaged 
in abuses of the hapless Puso villagers. The latter now were caught in 
a crossfire between rival counterinsurgency (?) or NP A (?) bands oper-
ating with local Army connivance. 135 
Meanwhile, especially on Mindanao, and emerging as a partial 
reaction to the Fundamentalist Islamic resurgency in that region, sev-
eral dozen, colorfully named, armed Christian charismatic bands have 
appeared, formally dedicated to exterminating both the NP A and lo-
cal Muslim secessionist groups, as well as warring with criminal gangs 
and other local "private armies." There are some 40 such anti-com-
munist Christian cult "armies." During the early 1980s, one of these 
groups, "Rock Christ," at one time numbering some 3,000 members, 
reportedly killed at least one hundred persons and was responsible for 
scores of kidnappings and "disappearances" in Misamis Oriental prov-
ince. Weapons and intelligence provided by a unit of the 125th Philip-
pine Airborne Company stationed in Pagadian city in the early 1980s 
is said to have helped "Rock Christ" get started. 136 Members of other 
still active groups, like the so-called Tadtad (also called "Corazon Se-
135. Ang Pahayangang Malaya (Manila), June 8, 1986, p. 16, col. I. 
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iior" or "Heart of the Lord"), go forth "chanting pig Latin incanta-
tions and brandishing poison tipped knives" in their war against 
"Communist guerrillas and other 'enemies of God.' " 137 Still other 
charismatic cult armies, like the "Philippine Divine Missionaries of 
Christ" (PDMC), sharply clashed with roving NPA squads in the 
middle of 1986. Communist guerrilla leaders claimed that the alleged 
"anti-people" activities of the PDMC and other cult armies, including 
terrorism and extortion of farmers, demanded swift retribution. 138 
Traditional loyalties toward a local "warlord," resentment of 
Christians in their vincinity involving disputed land rights and, more 
recently, the widening impact of the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic 
Fundamentalism among Muslims everywhere, all shape participation 
in the "Moro National Liberation Front" (MNLF). The MNLF origi-
nally emerged in the 1960s and, although now badly fractured, is dedi-
cated to the defense of the land, Islamic religious legal rights, social 
and economic advancement, and, in varying degrees, autonomy or se-
cession of portions of the Southern Philippines and their formation as 
a new Islamic state. Muslims comprise only some 25 percent of the 
whole Southern Philippine population, however, and only in two prov-
inces, Sulu and Lanao del Sur, are they decisively in the majority. 139 
At present, the term MNLF almost has a generic meaning, com-
prising at least three major political factions, and scores of armed rival 
Muslim bands. Some of these bands are little more than private ar-
mies; "the Barracudas," for example, primarily are the bodyguard of 
the deposed, pro-Marcos, former governor of Lanao del Sur province, 
Ali Dimaporo, who is feuding with the Aquino government. Others, 
more broadly political in orientation, consider themselves the military 
cadre of a future, autonomous, "Moro Republic," in keeping with 
agreements worked out in Libya during the 1970s between Marcos 
and MNLF representatives, and earlier in 1987 in Jedah. 
In mid-1986, AFP Chief General Fidel Ramos estimated the 
strength of all MNLF units to be "about 5,300 armed regulars." But 
knowledgeable former MNLF leaders note-and rightly so, in this 
writer's opinion-that the size of the armed MNLF has been greatly 
exaggerated, and that "just over 2,000 armed men" is a more accurate 
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assessment of the movement's military strength. 140 As in the case of 
the NPA, however, the armed core of the MNLF is augmented con-
siderably by an unarmed satellite following motivated by political con-
viction, fear and opportunism. Aquino's efforts to reach a 
rapprochement with the MNLF have not succeeded. On September 5, 
1986 in Jolo, Aquino and MNLF leader Nur Misuari agreed to end 
hostilities between government and the Bangsa Moro (Muslim Nation) 
armed forces. But, on October 12, 1986, Armed Forces Chief Ramos 
charged Misuari with having violated the agreement; Moro insurgents 
continued to attack army patrols on Mindanao. 141 Shortly afterwards, 
Misuari announced that the MNLF would not recognize the new Con-
stitution, even though the Charter provided for the creation of "auton-
omous regions for Muslim Mindanao." An "independence 
proclamation" by Misuari on behalf of a new Moro Republic on No-
vember 25, 1986 underscored the intractability of the problem of 
achieving a settlement between the Philippine government and Moro 
guerrilla dissidents, given the general environment of gang violence in 
the region. Meanwhile rival Moro factions criticized both Aquino and 
Misuari. 
For the tens of thousands of underemployed or unemployed 
young males in the Philippines living in one of Asia's poorer and stag-
nant economies, an affiliation with an armed gang-any gang-affords 
status, adventure and, for as long as it lasts, a means of support. Ritu-
alistic posturing, as in the case of the charismatic cult gangs, may be 
important. But except perhaps in the cadre structure of the NP A, and 
among some of the religious MNLF leadership, hard core ideology is 
not the essence of all these little outlaw power structures. Rather, the 
"private armies" are symptoms of the failure of the diverse and geo-
graphically scattered Filipino people to secure for themselves a 
broadly accepted constitutional base of government, infused by a com-
mon adhesion to public law. 
Meanwhile, there is no shortage of recruits for the "private ar-
mies," nor of new organizations to accommodate them. One illustra-
tion will suffice. Not the least of the current sources of instability of 
the Aquino government and its successors is the presence not just of 
loosely defined civilian "Marcos loyalists" but of AFP military, who 
have been "Absent without Official Leave" (AWOL) since February 
25, 1986. Claims made by Marcos from time to time, from his Hono-
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lulu exile, that a large segment of the AFP remains loyal to him have 
been rejected as "fabricated and exaggerated" by the Defense Minis-
try, while Armed Forces Chief Ramos repeatedly has dismissed the 
threat of any mass action or armed resistance by Marcos support-
ers. 142 Yet, reports persist emanating from within the military intelli-
gence community that (1) 40,000 Philippine military abandoned their 
posts after Aquino assumed office and still are "AWOL," and 
(2) scores of active and retired pro-Marcos AFP officers are organizing 
a "destabilizing" campaign and even an armed resistance movement, 
using distant Palawan province as their initial rallying base. 143 Widely 
rumored to be in the pay of the former President's followers, the par-
ticipants in periodic pro-Marcos demonstrations in Manila's Rizal 
Park, indeed, may constitute no threat at all to Aquino's future. But 
the Philippines hardly needs the depradations of still more roaming 
armed gangs, whatever their ideological or political motivation. 
V. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
A month before the February 7, 1986 Presidential election, Mrs. 
Aquino, in an address before members of the country's leading busi-
ness associations, outlined the principles and priorities of her eco-
nomic policy. Her first concern, she said, would be to address the 
interlocking problems of poverty, underemployment and unemploy-
ment. She said her government would plan to "move decisively" to 
alleviate these problems, not least because she considered such move-
ment to be integrally related to "our response" to the Communist in-
surgency. Further, she planned to renegotiate the terms of the 
Philippines' foreign debt, then standing at $26 billion. She also de-
clared she would "dismantle" the sugar, coconut and other monopo-
lies (strongholds of Marcos' favorites) and stimulate investment, 
"primarily" in labor intensive, rurally based, small and medium-sized 
agricultural enterprises, particularly in food production for domestic 
consumption. In general, she emphasized that her government would 
have "higher expectations of self regulation and social responsibility 
from business"-higher, presumably, than in the Marcos era. Foreign 
investment would be welcome in the Philippines, but "only" if it sup-
plemented domestic capital in those major areas where domestic capi-
tal was inadequate. 144 
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Though hardly sufficient time has passed to render a comprehen-
sive judgment on the implementation of Aquino's economic program, 
enough has become apparent to draw some preliminary conclusions. 
First, it seems well to sketch the plight of the Philippine economy. By 
any measure, that economy is among Asia's sickest; certainly it is cur-
rently the least flourishing in ASEAN (the six-member Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations comprising the Philippines, Brunei, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand). 
In 1970, the Philippine annual Gross National Product (GNP) 
growth rate had been 6.6 percent. By 1982 it had dropped to 2.8 per-
cent, and in 1984 and 1985 it was a negative 5.3 percent and 3.95 
percent, respectively. Philippine per capita income in 1985 was $580. 
This was still higher, to be sure, than that of $560 in Indonesia-but 
the Indonesian economy, despite the slump in oil prices, has not exper-
ienced the sagging GNP of its Philippine neighbor. Not only does the 
Philippines suffer from one of Asia's highest inflation rates (25 percent 
in 1985 and 1986), but also from sharp polarizations of income and 
wealth. In an opinion of the Philippine Supreme Court, after a review 
of expert economic data in a relevant judicial proceeding, Philippine 
families earning monthly incomes of 2500 Pesos (about US $125) or 
less, were legally poor, and some 75 percent of the country's 55 million 
inhabitants were said to be in that category, according to the Court. 
In another calculation, 2 percent of all Filipino households not only 
have monthly incomes of 25,000 Pesos (about US $1250) or more, but 
together they hold about 16.5 percent of the 52 billion Pesos Philip-
pine national income. 145 
In the Metro Manila area alone, with its 7 million population, the 
official unemployment rate is about 20 percent. But other, more au-
thoritative, estimates of Manila's unemployment go as high as 30 per-
cent, while for the nation as a whole the unemployment rate is set at 
between 15 percent and 20 percent of the labor force, with an addi-
tional 45 percent nationwide considered to be underemployed. 146 
Meanwhile, the nationwide annual crude birth rate is at least 2.3 per-
cent, one of the region's highest. The gap of opportunity between rich 
and poor is widening: only 39 percent of Filipino children enrolled in 
the first grade ever complete their secondary education because of 
what the Philippine Ministry of Education calls the "economic cri-
145. Asiaweek, February 16, in 1986, p. 42; Times Journal (Manila), November 18, 
1984, p. 4, in FBIS, November 20, 1984, p. P5. 
146. Bulletin Today (Manila), December 16, 1985, p. 25, in FBIS, December 24, 1985, 
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sis." 147 In widely separated areas of the country, the effects of malnu-
trition on children are becoming apparent. Those effects in the rural 
areas such as Negros and Samar-both active operational grounds of 
the NPA-are well-known. But a recent study of the urban poor in 
Metro Manila estimates that 26.7 percent of children in that city in the 
age category from 6 months to 4 years also are malnourished (meaning 
moderately or severely underweight), which compares with 20.5 per-
cent overall of rural children in the same age group. 148 
Still, a volatile urban mass keeps growing. It is estimated that 
"for every 10 Metro Manilans today, at least three to four reside in 
slum or squatter areas" where basic services, whether housing or 
health care facilities, are absent. But all the while migration to the 
capital continues from the even less promising countryside. Rural mi-
gration to Manila during the first half of the 1980s has been conserva-
tively estimated at 150,000 people a year. By the year 2000, the 
capital will have 9.5 million inhabitants. Considering how Mrs. 
Aquino came to office, the "human wall" during the "miracle at 
EDSA," and the long-term political implications of "people power," 
the importance of a growing impoverished mass of Metro Manilans 
hardly requires elaboration. 149 
Against this background, it is difficult to underestimate the force 
of the expectations of the Manila poor centering around the fall of 
Marcos-however unrealistic these hopes may be. One tragi-comic il-
lustration of this came on February 26, 1986, only hours after Marcos 
had fled the Philippines. Thousands of Manila's slum dwellers rushed 
out to muddy, garbage-infested, worthless strips of land, including 
roadsides, in northern Manila. There they staked out legally meaning-
less claims on small plots for home sites or cultivation. Somehow they 
hoped that Aquino's coming to power and a vague election promise of 
land redistribution would permit them to keep their plots. 150 The new 
Aquino-endorsed Philippine Constitution of February 1987 captures 
something of this mood of popular expectations. In its article on 
"Family Rights," for example, it declares that "The State shall de-
fend" a family's right to "a family living wage and income," and 
"proper care and nutrition" for children. 151 
147. The Straits Times, December 31, 1985, p. 6. 
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Surrounded by charges of extensive corruption, by the granting of 
monopolies like those in sugar and coconut oil production, by reports 
of billions of dollars siphoned off by the Marcoses and conspicuously 
consumed or invested abroad-the Philippine economy is unlikely to 
find a balanced assessment for some time. Moreover, the hopes of 
"Juan de la Cruz" (the Filipino nickname for the man in the street) 
that better economic times are ahead under Aquino are beginning to 
fade. 
For example, prices of basic necessities-food, clothing, shelter, 
medical care, schooling and transportation costs-have not fallen and 
are unlikely to do so. Even after costly strikes, wage increases do not 
meet basic family needs for most Manila factory workers. Though a 
modest upswing did occur later in the year, GNP growth for 1986 is 
expected to be "flat." Indeed, already at the close of July 1986, the 
Aquino government announced that first half year GNP had fallen a 
further 3 percent from the comparable period a year ago. 152 Coinci-
dentally, with the upsurge of anti-Marcos agitation following the as-
sassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino (August 21, 1983) at 
Manila International Airport, economic activity began to drop 
sharply. Between 1983 and mid-1986 there was a nearly 13 percent 
decline in overall economic activity. 153 By mid-1986, manufacturing 
output and industrial employment rose modestly, but construction in 
the second quarter of 1986 dropped by 60 percent compared to the 
first quarter-"a blow to Manila's army of casuallaborers." 154 
One reason for further diminished business confidence and the 
hesitation of foreign investors apparent since 1983 is that the Aquino 
government is perceived as unable to calm the labor market. During 
Marcos' martial law era (1973-81), strikes were forbidden. Between 
the period of the lifting of martial law and Marcos' fall, the number of 
strikes or work stoppages began to grow. But since the rise of Aquino, 
they accelerated even more: by the end of July 1986, for example, 
there had already been 368 strikes for the year, surpassing the total 
number of strikes, 371, for all of 1985. The growing political turbu-
lence since 1983, and including the first half year of the Aquino ad-
ministration, meant losses to the Philippines of some 4 million man-
days. Worse, the policy pronouncements of Aquino's then Labor 
Minister Augusto Sanchez were perceived by many in the business sec-
tor as inflammatory and as encouraging political labor action and 
152. Manila Bulletin, June II, 1985, p. 15, col. 3; Far Eastern Economic Review, August 
7, 1986, p. 56. 
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strikes by leftist trade unions like the earlier named KMU (Kilusang 
Mayo Uno-May First Movement). Meanwhile, hundreds of busi-
nesses were and are closing, laying off workers. In the period from 
January to May 1986, the total of new business enterprises established 
(2,947) was down 6.8 percent from the year before. But the number of 
new entrants into the Philippine labor market each year now is 
750,000. 155 Toward the close of 1986, Aquino directed the Philippine 
Labor Ministry to take a more aggressive stand in settling strikes 
through mediation. The resignation of Sanchez, in mid-December 
1986, led to angry criticism of and demonstrations against Aquino by 
KMV and the left, but soothed the business community somewhat. 
To service the Phlippines' more than $27 billion total debt now 
requires about 70 percent of the country's export earnings of about $5 
billion-and during the first half year of the Aquino administration 
the value of the country's exports were down by 0.4 percent from the 
previous year. Yet, despite all these unpromising indicators, there are 
many international sources willing to provide the Aquino govern-
ment's most immediate economic demands, such as meeting the $1.35 
billion national budget deficit in 1986 and reorganizing the economy 
for long-term stabilization and growth. Contributions, mostly loans 
and credits, from the U.S. Economic Support Fund, the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank and private Japanese banks, now avail-
able to Aquino, already aggregate about $740 million, with an addi-
tional $1.7 billion in current pledges. 156 Additionally, there have been 
assurances of aid from the European Economic Community, Britain 
and CanadaY7 By the end of 1986, the flexibility of the International 
Monetary Fund in providing new stand-by credits and the readiness of 
the Asian Development Bank and other sources to provide credits for 
various capital projects, even began to raise the question of whether 
the Aquino government could "digest" the funding approved. 158 
A basic development problem, however, is the dissension within 
the Aquino government over the course of economic policy, particu-
larly import liberalization. The International Monetary Fund has in-
sisted on such liberalization as a condition for new credits and debt 
rescheduling. The liberalization demand requires Manila to lift re-
155. Asiaweek, June 29, 1986, p. 44; Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 1986, pp. 
54-55. 
156. Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 July, 1986, p. 63 and August 7, 1986, p. 56; 
Asiaweek, May 25, 1986, p. 62 and June 29, 1986, p. 47. 
157. Agence France Presse despatch, Hongkong, June 27, 1986, in FBIS, July 1, 1986, 
p. P7. 
158. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 6, 1986, p. 79. 
60 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
strictions on the imports of more than 1200 items, ranging from food 
products to manufactures, some of which are produced in the Philip-
pines. It is feared that, because of import liberalization, Philippine 
domestic industries will be severely damaged. Trade and Industry 
Minister Jose Concepcion and major Philippine industrial associations 
have protested that the IMF demand "is a deliberate means for about 
212 industrial countries of the 149 member nations of the World Bank 
and IMF to make the Philippines go back to import dependence," 
even though other countries, meanwhile, are permitted to raise protec-
tionist barriers for their own industries. 159 Remarkably, however, Fi-
nance Minister Jaime Ongpin, during a meeting of major aid donors to 
the Philippines at the "Consultative Group on the Philippines," led by 
the IMF in Tokyo at the close of May 1986, promised "trade liberali-
zation" among a package of proposed Philippine reforms. Foreign 
banking sources at the meeting were skeptical, because Ongpin's offers 
"did not represent the agreed position of the Philippine 
government." 160 
Meanwhile, some top Aquino government planners, particularly 
those associated with the government's National Economic and Devel-
opment Authority, reportedly were in favor of seeing the Phlippines 
become a "competitive free market economy," based on "hard work, 
thrift and entrepreneurship." An Authority report, also published in 
May, demanded rejection of the "misguided protectionist policies of 
the past." The report accepted that there would be "economic 
shocks" as the country developed a new industrial and commercial 
base. 161 All this has not sat well with the Left. Meanwhile, the new 
February 1987 Constitution, in its provision on "State Policies," re-
quires that the state "shall develop" a self-reliant and independent na-
tional economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. 
With economic and political nationalism becoming increasingly 
popular as a driving force in the Philippines' perception of itself in the 
world, Aquino, by the end of July 1986, had approved a compromise 
suggestion of Concepcion. This postponed until October 1986 the im-
mediate lifting of import controls on some 160 items, and provided for 
another postponement of the lifting of controls on more than 240 addi-
tional products until well beyond June 1987, when they would have 
been "liberalized." Concepcion had warned that failure to postpone 
would have meant failing to "listen to what our people have to say." 
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Then Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez in the meantime emphasized 
that import "liberalization" would worsen the unemployment situa-
tion, as domestic industries would run the risk of being "buried" by 
imports. 162 
The IMF apparently acquiesced in those decisions when it ap-
proved a new Philippine loan and "special drawing rights" package. 
The quid pro quo was Aquino's agreement to a range of other, deep, 
financial and economic reforms, ranging from restructuring of govern-
ment financial institutions and tax reforms, to dismantling of sugar 
and coconut production monopolies and the "privatization" of gov-
ernment controlled corporations. Many of these reforms have their 
critics within the cabinet. The harsh reality of heavy budget deficits 
persists, however. And these deficits, short of debt repudiation, can 
for an indefinite time only be met through extensive foreign assistance. 
The main problem is that traditional donor nations are seeking to 
bring their deficits under control. A case in point involves the Phlip-
pines and the United States. To meet its US $1.35 billion government 
deficit in 1986, the Aquino government needed more than 1 billion 
dollars from foreign sources. Immediate foreign commitments avail-
able, however, still left some $500 million to be met from the World 
Bank, IMF and other sources. Among the other sources was the 
United States, whose House of Representatives, on August 7, 1986, 
voted to provide the Philippines with $350 million in aid, including an 
immediate $200 million in "ready cash." The latter amount-as 
Aquino's supporters put it-"could made or break" Aquino's regime. 
Aquino's backers in the House originally had asked for $250 million in 
"immediate" cash assistance. This was reduced by $50 million, how-
ever, after another amendment to eliminate the cash advance com-
pletely had failed. Even so, the reduced amount in immediate aid was 
voted only after some acerbic debate, in which one exasperated Con-
gressman protested: "We're asked to increase our own deficit by a 
quarter billion dollars so the Philippines' deficit can be reduced by half 
a billion dollars. Does that make sense to you?" 163 
It apparently all does make sense to the Reagan Administration. 
Though there has been some hesitation and reassessment of Aquino's 
accession to power in Reagan Administration circles, Washington 
clearly has taken the plunge. U.S. State Department officials have 
stressed the need to "forge stronger links with the new generation of 
Filipino leaders," and to assist in appropriate efforts "to restore eco-
162. Manila Bulletin, July 31, 1986, p. 13, in FBIS, p. PIO. 
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nomic prosperity to the Philippines." 164 The latter was an unfortunate 
phraseology because it raised the question when-in modern times-
the Philippines ever had been prosperous. Moreover, a promise by 
Washington, made on April 23, 1986, to introduce a broad new pro-
gram of economic and military assistance for the Aquino government 
"as an important manifestation of support by the American people in 
the Philippine people as they face a difficult challenge ahead," was not 
all that new after all. 165 The Marcos government also had been a ma-
jor recipient of stepped up U.S. aid. 
In fiscal year 1981, for example, total U.S. aid to the Philippines 
was $173.2 million (more than 97 million of it in economic assistance, 
the rest in military aid). In fiscal 1985-Marcos' crisis year-Ameri-
can assistance had grown to $264.4 million ($222.2 million in eco-
nomic and $42 million in military aid). Even for the "out years," and 
before the newly-approved infusions of assistance when Aquino took 
office, $235.9 million had been allocated for 1986 ($181.2 in economic 
and $54.5 million in military aid) and only an estimated $228.4 million 
($125.7 million in economic and $102.7 million in military aid) for 
1987. 166 The last figure might lead the unwary to assume that the 
initial U.S. policy reaction-before the Reagan Administration's April 
23, 1986 announcement-to the dramatic Filipino events was to re-
duce assistance to the Philippines below the 1985 level, but to enlarge 
the military component in such requested aid. 
The April 23, 1986 promise of more American help to Aquino as 
an "important" gesture by the American to the Philippine people, only 
came after a special "Lobbying" journey to Washington two weeks 
earlier by Philippine Finance Minister Jaime Ongpin. 167 The latter 
had minced no words in describing his country's immediate financial 
crisis and its long-term development problems. 
Subsequently, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said that he, 
"as a Chicago economist," could not have improved on Ongpin's as-
surance to the Asian Development Bank that "the principal thrust" of 
the Philippine economic recovery was "to motivate the private sector" 
to resume its "traditional role as the prime mover" of the Philippine 
economy. 168 It has been the relationship of that private sector to for-
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eign investment capital and to the development assistance received 
from such institutions as the World Bank, particularly during the 
Marcos era, that earlier raised probing questions in various quarters 
about the continuing dependent condition of the Philippine political 
economy. 169 There already are critics who wonder whether Mrs. 
Aquino's policies in this regard will mark a significant break from the 
Marcos past. Today, the Aquino regime too is under attack from la-
bor and Left intellectual and media circles for permitting foreign lend-
ers to dictate the structure of the national economy, at the cost of the 
small Filipino farmer and entrepreneur. The import liberalization 
scheme, for example, has been branded as benefitting primarily "US 
agribusiness interests" and foreign manufacture importers. 170 
Yet, without important liberalization, bank restructuring and 
"privatization" of government-controlled corporations, as the IMF 
and some other foreign lenders insist, an operational rationalization of 
the economy may well be all but impossible. And without IMF and 
foreign lenders' support, the aid to keep the Aquino regime afloat will 
not be forthcoming. Without such help, it also would not allow the 
Aquino government to implement a massive but huge budget deficit 
generating public works program-in effect a "crash employment 
plan" in the countryside. 171 It also would be difficult to pay the sala-
ries of the bloated government services, including those of the ineffi-
cient state corporations. 
Mrs. Aquino and her advisers have discovered that bringing 
Marcos down was not just a political act. It also brought in its wake-
intended or not-the need for a major reorganization of the Philippine 
economy, a process with implications and obstacles far beyond the 
simple sloganizing for greater autonomy and distributive justice heard 
during the Presidential campaign and embodied in the February 1987 
Constitution. Reaching the major goals of Aquino's announced eco-
nomic program before her accession to power, like improving the un-
employment problem, promoting food production and smaller labor-
intensive enterprises and limiting the role of foreign capital-likely 
will take a good deal longer than many of her more ardent partisans, 
169. Robert B. Stauffer, "The Political Economy of Refeudalization, pp. 180-218 in 
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particularly on the Left, care to wait. It would not be difficult to find a 
scapegoat, since the Aquino regime also has committed itself, accord-
ing to the February 1987 Contitution, to recognize "the indispensable 
role of the private sector" and to provide "incentives to needed 
investments." 
As an unfair, paradoxical reality, in the meantime, there remains 
the persistent problem of the sense of uncertainty and lack of commit-
ment to the national economic development effort apparent in the 
Philippine business community, something which Aquino already has 
castigated. That lack of commitment, sadly, may become part of a 
self-fulfilling prophecy of Aquino's political and economic future. As 
one leading Filipino executive, surveying the state of the nation's econ-
omy under Aquino, has put it, "if there is no credibility there is no 
confidence. If there is no confidence you can't attract investments." 172 
VI. CONCLUSION: A COMMUNITY OF U.S.-FILIPINO 
STRATEGIC INTERESTS? 
More than twenty years ago, at the start of the Marcos era, the 
author, after assessing the Philippine public temper, noted among 
many Filipinos a weary impatience, often bordering on anger, over the 
persistent weight of U.S. stratgegic and economic power in their coun-
try.173 Much of that angry impatience, then as now, has tended to 
focus on the U.S. military installations in the Philippines. But, beyond 
that, there is the resentful realization of Philippine dependence, decade 
after decade, on U.S. economic largesse. 
Yet, with few countries in the world is the human relationship of 
the United States so close as with the Philippines. With monotonous 
regularity, year after year, Leftist nationalists, in youth groups like the 
Kabataang Makabayan and in trade unions like the Kilusang Mayo 
Uno (KMU), stage their demonstrations for one reason or another 
before the American Embassy on Manila's Roxas Boulevard. With 
equal regularity, every working day, scores of Filipinos early in the 
day, start lining up before that same Embassy, seeking visas to enter 
the United States. According to the U.S. Statistical Abstract there 
were, as of 1980, some 501,400 Filipinos in the United States, 44.7 
percent of them now naturalized U.S. citizens, leaving nearly 278,000 
in some other status. (The actual number of Filipino aliens in the 
United States probably is much larger.) But whatever that status, for 
172. Asiaweek, February 16, 1986, p. 42. 
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the vast majority of the half million, ties with their land of origin re-
main strong. And though enduring fashion, especially among the 
young, demands harsh criticism of the United States almost as a mat-
ter of lifestyle, that fashion has never lessened the appeal of the "green 
card," i.e. permanent residence in America. 
Predictably, the rise of Aquino has raised new questions about the 
Philippine military connection with the United States. These ques-
tions typically range from the fairness of the financial quid pro quo for 
Filipinos to have U.S. bases in their country, to the strategic necessity 
of having them at all. By implication, they also raise questions about 
the Philippines' regional security needs and foreign policy. 
According to a recent analysis by a consortium of Philippine re-
search and study groups working under the auspices of the National 
Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), the United States pays 
much less for the use of its Philippine bases than for such facilities 
elsewhere in the world. 174 Under the present U.S.-Philippine Military 
Bases Agreement, which expires in 1991, Washington provides the 
Manila government with $900 million of "aid" (the Philippines insists 
on calling it "rental," thereby emphasizing that it has sovereign power 
over the bases) for the five-year period 1986-1991 for the use of Clark 
Air Force Base in Angeles City and Subic Bay Naval Station in Olon-
gapo. This amount, as the NDCP analysis shows, works out to $180 
million a year-which compares with U.S. payment of $415 million 
per annum to Spain for use of facilities there, $501 million annually to 
Greece, and $938 million to Turkey. What is termed U.S. access and 
"landing rights" in Egypt and Israel costs Washington per annum 
$1.75 billion and $1.4 billion, respectively. After comparing all these 
figures, one Manila columnist wrote that "Whether 'rent' or 'assist-
ance,' we have been getting the short end of the stick from Washington 
for many years now . . . next time we talk, let's go for the brass 
ring. ,17s 
Looking at the amount of "rental" payment or "aid" alone is 
hardly an adequate index of the contribution which the presence of the 
U.S. bases makes to the Philippine economy. Not in Egypt, Israel, or 
Turkey, for example, are employment opportunities provided for 
thousands of local workers, as is the case at the U.S. installations in 
the Philippines. Nor are there comparable injections of spending into 
local economies made by U.S. service personnel and their dependents. 
Still, the "rental" comparisons linger in the public mind, feeding the 
174. Midday (Manila), June 6, 181, p. I, col. I. 
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sense of aggrieved dependence and resentment over perceived exploita-
tion that has run for decades through the U.S.-Philippine relationship. 
In the discussions and decisions of the "Concom" in July and August 
1986, that sense of aggrievement was particularly evident. 
At present, few authoritative observers doubt that, after 1991, the 
U.S. military presence in the Philippines will continue. But it will 
come only after a burst of nationalist rhetoric in the new Philippine 
Congress, and perhaps after a national plebiscite, and only at the cost 
to Washington of a substantially higher "rental," as well as further 
assertions of Philippine sovereign and operational control. No Filip-
pine politician will be able to afford to ignore a considerably increased 
Filipino public sensitivity to the bases issue, along with a broadened 
awareness of the importance of the bases to the United States. That 
greater sensitivity and awareness are themselves a legacy of the fall of 
Marcos and the rise of Aquino. These, it may be recalled, prompted 
worried Pentagon estimates of the heavy cost to the United States of 
having to relocate the Clark and Subic facilities if that became 
necessary. 
The NDCP analysis, moreover, also contains a section, well pub-
licized in the Philippine media, on the eleven U.S. military facilities in 
the Philippines, other than Subic and Clark. Virtually all of these 
eleven are highly sophisticated and needed communications stations, 
maintaining intelligence flow or surveillance at a time of a growing 
Soviet military presence in the Philippine strategic environment. Be-
cause of Aquino and the much amplified voice she has given to one 
dimension of the public temper that is more openly and sharply criti-
cal of the persisting U.S. presence in the country, the periodic "battle 
of the bases" fought in Philippine politics is likely to be more intense 
in the future. 
But are the U.S. bases in the Philippines necessary at all-partic-
ularly to the Philippines? To some observers, the liability of the bases 
outweighs any advantages, since they are seen as so many "magnets to 
attack." That view, inter alia, is heard among some contributors to 
the NDCP report. Mrs. Aquino's view that the Philippines would not 
face an external threat if the American bases were removed also strikes 
a responsive chord in these quarters. As the debate over the future of 
the bases grew in the middle of 1986, the U.S. Embassy in Manila 
incautiously entered the fray, issuing a pamphlet rebutting recent Fili-
pino critics of the bases' pressence. This merely provoked a further 
attack, this time from several professors of the University of the Phil-
ippines. These professors declared that the very size and sophistica-
tion of the U.S. bases made it "likely that five megaton bombs will be 
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dropped on them." 176 
Meanwhile, U.S. spokesmen, from President Ronald Reagan on 
down, have stressed that "one cannot minimize the importance of 
those bases," and that the bases are essential to support the "wide-
ranging [U.S.] commitments all along the Asian littoral," as Assistant 
State Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Gaston Sigur, put 
it. 177 In December 1986, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet even 
declared that if the United States lost its naval and air bases in the 
Philippines, it "would be turning over our friends and allies to Soviet 
political and military domination in the region." Indeed, according to 
this view, there are no good "alternatives" to the Philippine bases, 
which remain essential if the United States intends to remain "a West-
em Pacific power." 178 In the Philippines, as we have seen, a principal 
adovcate of this position has been former National Defense Secretary 
Juan Ponce Enrile, who repeatedly has warned that the continued 
presence of the U.S. bases is necessary because their removal "will 
create a vacuum in this part of the world." 179 
In this context, the debate over the increased public interest since 
Aquino's rise to power in the bases issue has also provided greater 
impetus to a discussion of the Philippines' whole future relationship 
with other superpowers. What also is emerging as part of the debate 
over the bases is more attention to the possibility of a "neutral," genu-
inely non-aligned, and "inoffensive" Philippines, a country which 
would not be a danger and, therefore, a friend to all the superpowers 
and the regional states. The old Cold War alignments, from this point 
of view, are perceived as obsolete. In this perception, too, both 
Gorbachev's USSR and Deng Xiaopeng's China are considered as 
much more interested in pragmatic solutions to their development 
problems than to ideologically highly charged expansionist ambitions. 
Alejandro Melchor, the Philippines' new ambassador to the So-
viet Union, reportedly views superpower relations from this angle. 
Other Aquino cabinet officials, like the Trade and Industry Minister 
Jose Concepcion, are particularly interested in mitigating the Philip-
pines' one-sided financial and commercial dependence on the West 
and Japan, and are anxious to broaden Filipino-Soviet trade relations 
(which had a total value of only $44 million in 1985). Mrs. Aquino 
176. New Day, August 4, 1986, p. 6, in FBIS, August 5, 1986, p. P2. 
177. The Straits Times, Februray 21, 1986, p. 14, and Gaston J. Sigur, "US Security 
Interests in the Philippines" Current Policy (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Washington, D.C.), no. 815, April 10, 1985, p. l. 
178. The New York Times, December 11, 1986, p. A18, col. I. 
179. Manila Bulletin, July 23, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, July 24, 1986, p. P4. 
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supporters also recall that her slain husband, Benigno, essentially 
shared this "the Cold War is obsolete" philosophy. Benigno Aquino 
made several visits to the USSR, and in a book on his travels there, 
entitled Journey to Moscow, he urged his countrymen to abandon their 
negative Cold War preoccupations. 180 
However, to note the emergence under Aquino of a still stronger 
anti-U.S. bases sentiment and a more avowed "neutralist" current in 
Filipino opinion, is not to say that Philippine foreign policy is about to 
undergo a fundamental change. Nor is it to say that Philippine strate-
gic relationships with the United States are on the verge of collapse. 
Despite some audible anti-bases and "neutralist" sentiments, the Phil-
ippines continues in the same ambivalent strategic position as that of 
her fellow members of ASEAN. Though formally committed under 
their 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration to the establishment of 
ZOPFAN (a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), all ASEAN 
members also maintain arrangements for regular joint military exer-
cises and formal collective security arrangements with major Western 
powers, such as the United States with Thailand; Malaysia, Singapore 
and Brunei with the United Kingdom and Australia. ASEAN mem-
bers also maintain regular mutual consultations on defense matters. 181 
Thus far, in the budding debate over future Filipino "neutrality" 
and over a more evenhanded Filipino relationship with all the super-
powers, no one has raised the issue of the continuance of the 1952 US-
Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, nor of the 1954 Southeast Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty (usually known as the Manila Pact). De-
spite the formal dissolution of SEA TO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation), the operational arm of the Manila Pact in 1977, the provisions 
of the Pact itself remain in force. Under the 1952 Mutual Defense 
Treaty, which is of indefinite duration, the United States and the Phil-
ippines recognize (article 4) that an armed attack in the Pacific area on 
either of the parties would be a threat to the peace, requiring action to 
meet the "common danger." The Manila Pact essentially repeats this 
phraseology (article 4, subclause 1), and moreover demands (article 4, 
subclause 2) that defensive action be taken even if the sovereignty or 
"political independence" of the contracting parties "is threatened in 
any way other than by armed attack." 182 The last formulation is espe-
180. Asiaweek, August 10, 1986, p. 14. 
181. On ASEAN's Kuala Lumpur Declaration and its implications see, e.g., Dick Wil-
son, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia (Praeger, New York, 1975). 
182. Legislation on Foreign Relations with Explanatory Notes. Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, US. House of Representatives and Commitee on Foreign Relations, US. Senate 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., March, 1974), pp. 1072 and 1079. 
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cially significant, because it can be interpreted as a required response 
to a threat of domestic political or guerrilla subversion. 
As the NDCP analysis notes, the current U.S.-Philippine Mutual 
Bases Agreement provides that "operational use" of the U.S. military 
installations in the Philippines today, including for the purpose of 
"military combat operations", falls within the 1953 U.S.-Philippine 
Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1954 Manila Pact. Operations to be 
conducted "other than" those in the context of these two treaties, for 
example, the emplacement by the United States of long range missiles 
in the bases, shall be the subject of prior consultation between the two 
governments. Notwithstanding this, a 1979 amendment to the bases 
agreement assured the United States of "unhampered" use of its mili-
tary forces in the Philippines. 183 
In other words, the raison d'etre of the bases is specifically linked 
to two key strategic agreements of the Phlippine government, now 
more than a generation old. Should the movement toward elimination 
of the U.S. bases gain still further momentum in the Philippines, it 
seems probable that both U.S. and Philippine quarters will call in-
erased attention to the linkage of the bases to the 1952 and 1954 de-
fense treaties. Meanwhile, from the point of living with an anomaly-
i.e. voicing a desire for national or regional neutrality while maintain-
ing regular and close military support or security treaty arrangements 
with major powers outside the region-the Philippines hardly are 
unique among ASEAN members. 
Despite the Reagan Administration's obvious campaign from the 
middle of 1986 or so onward to charm Mrs. Aquino and stress Wash-
ington's commitment to and positive expectations from her regime, it 
likely will be less America's own strategic needs and more Philippine 
security interests that ultimately will allow for the continued presence 
of U.S. bases beyond 1991. Toward making such a decision, Aquino 
has given a stronger voice and more intellectual depth to the argument 
of a more "neutral" or truly non-aligned Philippines. U.S. Secretary 
of the Navy John Lehman might warn, as he did on AprillO, 1986, in 
testimony before a Senate Subcommitee on Seapower that "there are 
no substitutes" to Subic and Clark bases and that, therefore, it is criti-
cal for the United States to retain control of these installations. 184 
Lehman's--or any other U.S. official's--concern is likely to be less 
decisive for Filipinos than Mrs. Aquino's confident perception (i.e., 
183. Midday (Manila), June 6, 1986, p. 6, col. 3-4. 
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that her country would face no external threat if the United States 
bases were not renewed) that renewal of U.S. rights simply is too risky. 
A major factor in the Philippine risk assessment is the reality of a 
steady projection of Soviet military power in the South China Sea area 
and the Pacific. In the past three years, the Soviet naval presence in 
Pacific waters has nearly doubled. The USSR today has 410 vessels in 
these waters, among them 115 submarines (of which 30 carry nuclear 
missiles) and two Kiev-class aircraft carriers. Directly across the 
South China Sea from the Philippines, at Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay 
station, the USSR now regularly maintains up to 25 naval vessels. So-
viet aircraft permanently stationed in Vietnam include a squadron of 
advanced MiG-23 fighter aircraft. Some 7,000 Soviet military are now 
based in Vietnam alone, and the Cambodian port of Kompong Som 
clearly is being secured to accommodate a regular Soviet military pres-
ence. At the same time, the USSR is reaching out across the Eastern 
Pacific, seeking port facilities or fishing and exploratory rights and of-
fering the assistance of its technicians to such smaller island nations as 
Kiribati and Vanuatu. If the Soviets' Pacific activity continues, as 
seems probable, then by 1991 the U.S. Air Force's 9,400 personnel and 
F-4E fighter squadrons and tactical airlift wing at Clark base, and the 
5,300 U.S. sailors, carriers, submarines and other nearby U.S. Seventh 
Fleet vessels at Subic, would seem a good deal more comforting to 
doubtful Filipinos. 185 
Those in the Philippines who would pin their hopes on a mutual 
U.S.-Soviet force reduction in the Pacific area also will have to con-
tend with the strategic consequences of one of Southeast Asia's more 
intractably unresolved problems, i.e. the Vietnamese presence in Cam-
bodia and the Cambodian, ASEAN, U.S. and Chinese resistance to 
that presence. I will not review the tortuous course of the Cambodian 
political, military and diplomatic conflict. However, at the close of 
1978, the Vietnamese invaded their Cambodian neighbor in force and 
continue to maintain some 160,000 troops, despite the cost of regular 
international condemnation and isolation from development opportu-
nities. Suffice it to say that for various reasons none of the three super-
powers perceives any urgent need for compromise in the Cambodian 
problem. 186 
Although year after year, numerous proposed solutions to the 
185. The Military Balance 1985-1986 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London, 1985), pp. 24, 30; The New York Times, August 10, 1986, p. E3. See also Alvin H. 
Bernstein, "The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay," The National Interest (Washington, D.C.) 
(Spring 1986), pp. 17-29. 
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Cambodian problem whirl about the diplomatic circuit, Vietnam's de-
pendence on the USSR for economic and military assistance (now run-
ning an estimated $2.5 billion per annum) continues apace - as does 
the Soviet quid pro quo in using Vietnamese military installations at 
Danang, Cam Ranh Bay and elsewhere. The Soviet presence in Viet-
nam adds to the arsenal of arguments of those pointing to the necessity 
of maintaining U.S. bases in the Philippines. 
Soviet media, to be sure, cite with approval occasional Philippine 
press comment that the "vacuum theory is a colonialist weapon." 187 
This is a reference to the above cited argument that the withdrawal of 
the United States from Clark and Subic bases would create a danger-
ous "vacuum". The Soviets also contend that the vacuum theory is 
"totally at variance with the policy of the USSR," which, it is said, 
calls for mutual reductions in armed activity and political tensions in 
the region. 188 Along these lines, on July 28, 1986, in a wide-ranging 
statement in Vladivostok dealing with Soviet interest in and commit-
ment to a settlement of various unresolved disputes in the Far East, 
the Soviet party's Secretary General, Mikhail Gorbachev, declared al-
most in passing that "In general, I'd like to say that if the U.S. were to 
give up its military presence, say in the Philippines, we wouldn't leave 
that step unanswered." 189 What Gorbachev had in mind with this 
vague offer of a quid pro quo is speculation at best. In the Aquino 
government, not even the severest critic of the continuance of U.S. 
bases believes that Gorbachev's statement "in general" signals an im-
portant new Soviet peace overture. 
In this connection, the People's Republic of China is also a player 
in the Cambodian game and, therefore, in the base problem. The 
United States could reduce its Philippine or Western Pacific military 
presence. And yet Beijing, implacably opposed to Vietnam's military 
presence in and political dominance of Cambodia today, would remain 
a threat to Hanoi - and thus justify Vietnam's continued desire for a 
Soviet military support presence. The Chinese threat is not an idle 
one: in 1979 China briefly invaded and occupied a strip of territory in 
North Vietnam as a "punitive lesson" to Hanoi for its invasion of 
Cambodia and alleged maltreatment of Chinese residents. Since then, 
Beijing's spokesmen have warned Hanoi from time to time of the pos-
Cambodian Conflict (The Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1986), Conflict Stud-
ies no. 183. 
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sibility of a "second punitive lesson." Chinese-Vietnamese military 
clashes at their common border have been frequent over the years. In 
short, Philippine security concerns are not just linked to the present 
commitment of U.S.-Soviet power in the Pacific, but also to a Sino-
Vietnamese compromise in Cambodia with which that power commit-
ment is inextricably linked. 
Thus far, the Aquino government, like the Marcos regime before 
it, has shown little interest and taken little initiative in bringing the 
stalemated Cambodian question to a close. Indeed, official Philippine 
pronouncements on the matter since 1979 have been fewer than that of 
any other ASEAN member. What Philippine statements there are on 
the issue also show little of the probing concern for a diplomatic solu-
tion, or even a reaction to the danger of the problem, characteristic of 
Indonesia, Thai or Singapore statements. The Philippine position, 
thus far, essentially has been to tag along with the policy proposals of 
other ASEAN members. This is surprising. For though one may ap-
plaud the increased public discussion since the rise of Aquino of the 
future of U.S. bases in the Philippines, such a debate is unlikely to 
yield much of a consensus until the triangle of superpower interests 
around Indochina and the South China Sea is more fully understood. 
In the meantime, the dominant U.S. role in the IMF-World 
Bank, and its influence in international money markets, generally give 
Washington powerful assets with which to continue to define the Phil-
ippine national security agenda. Short of a revolutionary break with 
the United States and all that it entails, neither Aquino nor her succes-
sor regimes seem in a position to alter that agenda. 
Noting this, I emphasize that the real danger to future U.S. stra-
tegic interests in the country may well come from the Filipino percep-
tion that Washington is a meddler, if not a provocateur, in the political 
polarization process now taking place in the Philippines. Reports that 
it was the United States that has brought pressure to bear to seek the 
removal of such allegedly "left leaning" Aquino cabinet members as 
Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo and Labor Minister Augusto 
Sanchez feeds such a perception. 190 But indirectly, the founding (or 
perhaps one should say: re-founding) in mid-August 1986 of the new 
Nacionalista Party as a vehicle for Enrile and the Right, and of the 
new "People's Party" (Partido ng Bayan), led by Jose Sison, also feeds 
such a perception. 
Meanwhile, the steady bolstering of Aquino's position, including 
190. The New Philippines Daily Express, August 12, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, August 13, 
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by editorial policies of the U.S. media, has not necessarily improved 
the image of the United States. To be sure, on February 2, 1987 
Aquino won an impressive 77% of the electorate's vote in support of 
her personally endorsed new Constitution. The vote was seen as an 
endorsement of Aquino's own Presidential legitimacy as well. Critics 
noted that after carefully replacing the local bureaucracy with her own 
official appointees, the outcome of the February 2 poll was assured-
given past patterns of electoral compliance. More pointed was the fail-
ure of the Aquino regime to do any better in reaching a rapproche-
ment with the NPA insurgents than Marcos. On January 30, 1987 
CPP spokesmen finally announced that they would not continue the 
60-day truce with the AFP after its February 8, 1987 deadline. Within 
days after the expiration date it came to sharply stepped up fighting. 
This time a Philippine President faces a Communist resurgence with 
and AFP critical, if not hostile, toward the Chief Executive's position 
and policies: not a source of comfort for the US. The end of Marcos 
likely will increase rather than lessen the turbulence of American-Fili-
pino relations. 
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